ENVER HOXHA



THE ISTITUTES OF MARXIST- LENINIST STUDES

AT THE CC OF THE PLA

TIRANA 1980



THE KHRUSHCHEVITES

memoirs

Part III





10. TEMPORARY RETREAT IN ORDER TO TAKE REVENGE

The Soviets demand «unity». The Moscow Meeting of 1957. Khrushchev's negotiations to bring Tito to the meeting. Khrushchev's shortlived .,anger». Debate over the formula: -Headed by the Soviet Union.» Gomulka: «We are not dependent on the Soviet Union.» Mao Zedong: «Our camp must have a head because even a snake has a head.» Togliatti: «We must open new roads», «we are against a single leading centre», .«we do not want to use Lenin's thesis 'the party of the new type'». Mao's sophistry: 80 per cent, 70 per cent and 10 per cent "Marxists». The Mescow Declaration and the Yugoslav reaction. Khrushchev disguises his betrayal under the name of Lenin.

The aim of the Khrushchevites, who were restoring capitalism in the Soviet Union, was to make it a great social-imperialist power, and hence, it had to be armed to the teeth, because the storm which they raised would not only destroy the unity of the socialist camp but would also make the contradictions with American imperialism acute. The Khrushchevites knew that the United States of America had greater strength than the Soviet Union, both in the economy and in armaments.

The demagogic policy of the Khrushchevites about the «new epoch of peace» and «disarmament» was a policy to mislead the gogos*. *( innocents (French in the original).) The United States of America and world capitalism took advantage of it to deepen the crisis of communism, to avoid the rapid onset of the economic and political crisis which was threatening America itself, and to consolidate their markets and alliances, and especially NATO. For their part, the Khrushchevites struggled for the consolidation of the Warsaw Treaty, to turn it into a strong Soviet means to shackle our countries. Under the disguise of «defence against NATO», they managed to turn the stationing of Soviet troops into a military occupation of many countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

In fact, the imperialist threat had been and still was real, but with the advent to power of the Khrushchevites, our countries were considered as battlefields outside the Soviet borders and our peoples as cannon-fodder for the Soviet revisionists. They tried to put the army, the economy, culture and everything under their control and direction. All the parties of the socialist countries fell into this Khrushchevite trap, with the exception of the Party of Labour of Albania.

However, friction, disagreements and quarrels would inevitably arise, even amongst those who followed and submitted to Khrushchev's line, all of them proceeding from unprincipled aims and an unprincipled policy. The bourgeoisie and international reaction fanned up these disagreements in order to deepen the splits within the «communist bloc».

Khrushchev and Co. saw this process and used all means and ways to restrict and isolate it.

To achieve their strategic aims, the Khrushchevites needed the «friendship» of all, especially of the parties and countries of the socialist camp, therefore, they used various tactics to -consolidate their relations», to smooth over the disagreements, to subjugate the others and establish their leadership over them.

Their method of operation in the service of their aims included meetings and contacts, almost always in Moscow, in order to make Moscow, if not de jure, at least de facto, the centre of international communism, in this way, always having the advantage of their bugging devices and being able to work on, and keep one or the other under control through their men.

It was clear that things were not going smoothly for the Khrushchevites. The Soviet Union had many different contradictions with Albania, China and even other countries of people's democracy. The line of «freedom». and «democracy» bombastically proclaimed at the 20th Congress, was now boomeranging back on the Soviet leadership itself. The ranks had begun to disintegrate. However, the Khrushchevites needed to preserve the political-ideological <<unity» of the socialist camp and the international communist movement at all costs, at least in appearance. In this direction and for this aim, the 1957 Moscow Meeting was organized.

Khrushchev and Co. made feverish efforts not only to ensure that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia would take part in that meeting as a party of a socialist country», but if possible also, to ensure that Tito would reach agreement with Khrushchev over the platform, the method of procedure and the conclusions of the meeting. In this way, the «unity» dreamed of and urgently sought by the Khrushchevites, would have looked more complete than ever. However, Tito was not one to be easily rounded up with Khrushchev's flock. Many letters were exchanged and several bilateral contacts were organized between the men of Khrushchev and Tito on the eve of the meeting, but just when it seemed that an understanding had been reached, everything was upset and the gulf became even deeper. Each side wanted to exploit the meeting for its own aims: Khrushchev, to declare «unity», even with painful concessions to satisfy and draw in Tito, while the latter, to urge the others to openly and finally abandon Marxism-Leninism, the struggle against modem revisionism and any principled stand. Ponomaryov and Andropov went to Belgrade, engaged in free bargaining with Tito's representatives, displayed their readiness to retreat from many of their apparently principled former positions, but Tito from afar ordered:

«We shall come to the meeting, but only on condition that no declaration is published, because the international atmosphere will become tense and the imperialists will be angered and accuse us of 'communist menace'.

«We Yugoslavs cannot accept any kind of declaration, because our Western allies will think that we are linked with the socialist camp, and consequently might break off their close relations with Yugoslavia.

«We shall come to the meeting on condition that no mention will be made of the terms opportunism and revisionism there, because, otherwise, we are directly attacked.

«We shall come to the meeting on the condition that the policy of the imperialist powers is not attacked, because this would not serve the policy of reducing tension,» etc., etc.

In other words, Tito wanted the communists of the world to get together in Moscow to drink tea and swap stories.

However, it was precisely the declaration that Khrushchev needed, a declaration which would confirm «unity» and carry the maximum number of signatures. The discussions came to an end. Tito decided not to go to Moscow. Khrushchev's anger erupted, the terms «were made strong», the smiles and pats on the back for the «Marxist, Comrade Tito», were replaced for a moment with the epithet of the «opportunist», who «has nothing at all to do with Leninism», etc., etc.

However, Khrushchev used these «strong terms» about the chief of Belgrade only in the corridors and chance contacts, whereas in meetings he did not say one word against «Comrade Tito». On the contrary, when he had to speak -against» revisionists and all those who expressed opposition to the Soviet Union, he mentioned only two corpses thrown on the rubbish heap, Nagy and Djilas.

He still hoped that Tito might come to Moscow to confirm the «unity of the 13» as he had promised a little earlier, in Bucharest. But Tito was suddenly «ill»!

«A diplomatic illness!» said Khrushchev angrily, and asked us and the others what should be done in the situation when the Yugoslavs did not agree even to take part in the first meeting of the communist parties of socialist countries, let alone sign the declaration.

KWe have told you our opinion of them long ago, and every day is proving that we were and are right,» we replied. «We should not retreat because the Yugoslavs do not want to come.»

«That is what we think, too,» Suslov told us. And the meeting was held without the 13th, the odd man out.

However, although the Yugoslav revisionists did not take part in the first meeting, the meeting of parties of the socialist countries, they were present at its proceedings, because they were represented by their ideological brothers, Gomulka and Co. They came out openly in favour of Tito's theses and demanded advance from Khrushchev and others in the direction of further corruption and disorganization.

«We do not agree that we should speak of 'the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union',» declared Gomulka. «In practice we have given up the use of this term, in order to show that we are not dependent on the Soviet Union as in the time of Stalin.»

Soviet leaders themselves engaged in a cunning manoeuvre around this problem. In order to demonstrate their alleged adherence to principles in relations with the other sister parties, they had «proposed» that the term «headed by the Soviet Union- should not be used, because allegedly we are all «equal». However, they made this proposal only tentatively, in order to sound out the others on this, because in essence they were not simply for the term «headed by...», but if possible «under the direction of the Soviet Union» hence «dependent on the Soviet Union». This was what they intended and fought for, and time fully proved what the aims of the Khrushchevites were.

When Gomulka made his proposal at the meeting, the Soviet representatives scowled angrily and without coming out openly themselves first, urged the others to .attack Gomulka.

A lengthy debate broke out around this problem. Although the opinion was being crystallized amongst us more and more clearly each day that the leadership of the Soviet Union was deviating from the road of socialism, we continued to defend the thesis «headed by the Soviet Union» for reasons of principle and tactics. We were well aware that in coming out against this expression, Gomulka and his supporters, in fact, wanted to reject openly and without hesitation everything proven good and valuable from the decades of experience of the Soviet Union led by





Lenin and Stalin, to reject the experience of the October Revolution and the socialist construction in the Soviet Union in the time of Stalin, and to , deny the role which it was up to the Soviet Union to play f or the triumph and progress of socialism in many countries.

In this way, the revisionists, Gomulka, Togliatti and others, added their voices to the furious attack which imperialism and reaction had unleashed in those years against the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

To us, the defence of these important Marxist-Leninist achievements was an internationalist duty, therefore we strongly opposed Gomulka and the others. This was a matter of principle. On the other hand, the defence we made of the Soviet Union and the thesis «headed by the Soviet Union», both in 1957 and for two or three

years after this, was one of the tactics of our Party to attack Khrushchevite modern revisionism itself.

Although Khrushchev and the others knew our views and stands, at that time we had not yet come out openly before all the parties against the revisionist line which they were crystallizing, therefore, by strongly opposing the revisionist

theses of Tito, Gomulka, Togliatti and others in the eyes of all, at the same time, indirectly, we found the opportunity to attack the theses, stands and actions of Khrushchev himself, which in essence were identical with those of Tito and Co.

For entirely different aims and reasons, alien to Marxism-Leninism, Ulbricht, Novotny, Zhivkov of course, Dej, etc., also attacked Gomulka. They were wooing the favour of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev and, to this end, they left their ideological brother in the minority.

From the place he sat Mao Zedong brought out his «arguments».

«Our camp must have a head, because even the snake has a head, and imperialism has a head,» he said. -I would not agree that China should be called the head of the camp,» Mao went on, -because we do not merit this honour and cannot maintain this role, we are still poor. We haven't even a quarter of a satellite, while the Soviet Union has two. Then, the Soviet Union deserves to be the head because it treats us well. See how freely we are speaking now. If Stalin were here, we would find it difficult to speak like this. When I met Stalin, before him I felt like a pupil in front of his teacher, while with Comrade Khrushchev we speak freely, like equal comrades.

And as if this were not enough, he continued in his own style:

-With the criticism against the cult of the individual, it seemed as if a heavy roof, which was pressing down on us and hindered us from understanding matters correctly, was lifted from us. Who lifted this roof from us, who made it easier for all of us to understand the cult of the individual correctly?!» asked the philosopher, who was silent for a moment, and there and then supplied the answer: «Comrade Khrushchev, and we thank him for this.»

This is how the «Marxist- Man defended the thesis «headed by the Soviet Union» and he defended Khrushchev in the same way. However, at the same time, in order to avoid angering Gomulka, who was opposed to this thesis, Mao, as the equilibrist he was, added:

«Gomulka is a good comrade and must be supported and trusted!»

Very long debates were held, also, in connection with the stand towards modern revisionism.

Gomulka, in particular, supported by Ochab and Zambrowski, in the first meeting of the 12 parties of the socialist countries, and later Togliatti, in the second meeting of 68 parties, in which Tito's envoys also took part, were strongly opposed to the attack on modern revisionism, against defining it as the main danger in the international communist and workers' movement, because, as Ochab said, «with these formulations we alienated the wonderful and valiant Yugoslav comrades, and now you are alienating us Poles, too.»

Palmiro Togliatti got up in the meeting and proclaimed his ultra-revisionist theses:

«We must go further with the line of the 20th Congress to turn the communist parties into broad mass parties, must open new roads, and bring out new slogans,» he said in essence. «Now we need great independence in working out slogans and forms of collaboration,» he continued, «therefore we are opposed to a single leading centre. This centre would not be advantageous to the development of the individuality of each party and to bringing the broad masses of catholics and others closer around us.»

Jacques Duclos, who was sitting beside me, could not contain himself:

«I am going to get up and attack him openly,» he said to me. «Do you hear the things he is saying, Comrade Enver?!»

«Yes,» I said to Duclos. «He is expressing here what he has been thinking and doing for a long time.»

«In 1945,» continued Togliatti, «we declared that we wanted to create a new party. We say a 'new party' and do not want to use Lenin's thesis, 'the party of the new type' because, if we were to put it in this way, this would mark a great theoretical and political error, would mean to create such a communist party, which would break with the traditions of social-democracy. If we had built a party of the new type,» continued Togliatti, «we would have alienated the party from the masse& of the people and we would never have created the situation we have today, when our party has become a great mass party.»

After these and other theses of Togliatti, tempers flared up. Jacques Duclos rose to speak:

«We listened carefully to Togliatti's speech,» he said among other things, «but we declare that we do not agree in the least with what Togliatti said. His views open the way to opportunism and revisionism.»

«Our parties have been and are hindered by sectarianism and dogmatism,» interjected Togliatti.

At one moment Mao Zedong got up to calm the tempers, speaking in his style of allegories and implications. He said:

«On every... human issue one must go into battle, but also towards conciliation. I have in mind the relations between comrades: when we have differences let us invite each other to talks. In Panmunjon we had negotiations with the Americans, in Vietnam with the French.»

After several phrases of this type, he came to the point

«There are people,» he said, «who are 100 per cent Marxists, and others who are 80 per against revisionism, he has us in mind and mentions us by name. But even when we are not mentioned by name, everybody understands that we are implied, and that is why we do not take part in the meeting or sign the declaration of parties of socialist countries.»

And they did not sign this declaration.

Mao Zedong expressed his deep regret:

«They are not going to sign the 12 parties declaration,» he said. «As a rule, there ought to be 13 countries, but the Yugoslav comrades stood aside. We cannot force them. They are not going to sign. I say that in ten years' time they will sign the declaration.»* *( Mao was wrong only in the time he set. In fact, not ten years, but twenty years later a «declaration» was signed with the Yugoslavs in Beijing. The Maoists signed their submission to Tito (Author's note).)

The declaration which was worked out jointly and adopted at the meeting, summed up the experience of the international communist movement, defended the universal laws of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, and defined a series of common tasks for the communist and workers' parties, as well as the norms of relations among them.

Thus the adoption of the declaration was a victory for the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist forces. Over all, it constituted a correct program of joint struggle for the coming battles against imperialism and revisionism.

Nevertheless, although the modern revisionists were checked, and temporarily drew in their horns, they did not cease their evil work and had no intention of doing so. Khrushchev was to exploit the Moscow Meeting of 1957 as a means to prepare the terrain for the implementation of the diabolical anti-communist plan which he was to carry further.

He did his utmost to disguise his betrayal under the name of Lenin and, therefore, he made use of pseudo-Leninist phraseology, mobilized all the liberal pseudo-philosophers, who were awaiting the moment to adapt to revisionist lines (which they drew from the old social-democratic arsenal) Leninist disguises appropriate to the modern situation of the economic development of «our epoch of the superiority of socialism- and «the attainment, especially in the Soviet Union, of the stage of the construction of communism.»

Khrushchevism distorted Marxism-Leninism, considered it outdated, therefore it was to consider the phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat outdated, too, and would announce its replacement with the «state of the entire people». Consistent in his course of betrayal, Khrushchev, likewise, was to replace the party of the proletariat with the «party of the entire people». Consequently, according to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union was going over to «a higher phase, communism», at a time when, in reality, that country was still backward in industry and agriculture and its markets were empty. «The Soviet Union was going over to the phase of communism» only in the declarations of the Khrushchevites, because the reality testified to the opposite. Above all, that country especially needed a strong Marxist-Leninist party which would undertake the education of the Soviet man and the Soviet society which was degenerating.

This liberal bluff was trumpeted by Khrushchev and his theoreticians from daylight to dark. In the press, the radio and the whole of the Soviet propaganda, a great hullabaloo was made in this direction; in the streets, on the façades of buildings and the industrial projects, they put placards written in big letters, «Dognat i peregnat S.SH.A.»* *( Overtake and outstrip the USA (Russian in the original).) From the tribunes of meetings, the traitor shouted: «We have overtaken America in this or that sector, we shall outstrip it in agriculture (and even set the dates), we are going to bury capitalism,» etc. The revisionist theories were developed, elaborated and spread by the traitorous leaderships of pseudo-Marxist parties and a motley crowd of pseudo-Marxist philosophers, Trotskyites like Serven, Garaudy, Krivin, Fischer, and others, in all the capitalist countries, who had been lurking in the ranks of the communist parties, and who sprang up as Khrushchevite revisionists like mushrooms after the rain.

The genuine communists were taken by surprise. In this direction, the unhealthy anti-Marxist sentimentality, which prevented them from raising their voices against their parties which were degenerating, against old leaders who were betraying, against the Soviet Union, which they loved so much, from realizing the catastrophe for which the homeland of Lenin and Stalin was heading, played a negative role.

The capitalist bourgeoisie helped to deepen this confusion as much as possible with all its forces and economic and propaganda means.

In this way, Khrushchev's cunning plan was developed in detail through intrigues, pressure, demagogy, blackmail, false accusations and violation of the treaties, agreements and accords, which had existed between the Soviet Union and China, as well as between the Soviet Union and Albania, until the Khrushchevites arrived at the «famous» Bucharest Meeting.





11. «THE CARROT» AND «THE STICK»

Our Party and Government delegation goes to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's manoeuvres: the «carrot» in evidence - the Soviet government converts the credits into grants. Leningrad: PospyeIov and Kozlov censor our speeches. «We should not mention the Yugoslavs.» Our official talk with Khrushchev and others. Khrushchev gets angry: «You want to take us back to Stalin's course», «Tito and Rankovic aro better than Kardelj and Popovic. Tempo is an ass . . . , is unstable.» A chance meeting with the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Micunovic. Khrushchev's visit to Albania, May 1959. Khrushchev and Malinovsky ask us for military bases: «We shall control the whole Mediterranean from the Bosporus to Gibraltar.» The adviser on the extermination of dogs. The Soviet Embassy in Tirana, a centre of the KGB.

Our Party and its Central Committee saw the tragic course on which the Khrushchevites were leading the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as the directions which events were taking, and therefore they were in a great dilemma. The steps that we took had to be carefully measured: we should not be hasty, but neither must we go to sleep. Foreseeing difficult moments, we were greatly interested in strengthening the situation within the country and building up and further developing the economy and strengthening the army. In the first place and above all, we had to keep the Party on the rails of Marxism-Leninism, to fight the penetration of revisionism, and wage this fight by persistently defending the Leninist norms and protecting the unity in the leadership and in the Party. This was the main guarantee to keep us immune from Titoism and Khrushchevism. The Khrushchevites were keeping up their disguise and had no way to attack us openly in this field. Quite correctly, we defended the Soviet Union when all were attacking it. As I have written above, this was another important question of principle and, at the same time, our tactic against the Khrushchevites, who did not find weak spots in our stands.

They could not or did not want to exacerbate the contradictions with us. Perhaps, underrating the strength of our Party and the vitality of the Albanian people, they thought that they would strangle us because we were small, or that they would take the fortress from within by preparing their agency (as time showed, they had acted in this direction with Liri Belishova, Maqo Como, Panajot Plaku, Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Qako, and other collaborators and conspirators, whom we uncovered later). But irrespective of their efforts to «be on good terms» with us and to avoid hot-tempered actions, both they and we saw that the gulf was widening.

As before, the Yugoslav question was one of the main issues that divided us from the Khrushchevites, who did everything in their power to have us reconcile ourselves to the Yugoslav revisionists. Khrushchev wanted our reconciliation with them, because by means of this reconciliation he wanted us to relinquish our resolute Marxist-Leninist course, to relinquish any correct and principled stand on the internal and international planes, that is, to submit to the Khrushchevite line.

We had long understood this and did not give any ground in the face of the demagogy, the blackmail and the threats of Khrushchev. Apart from the instances which I related above, our meeting with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in April 1957 is typical in this direction. It was the period after the events in Hungary and Poland and after the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, held in February 1957.

At this plenum, we once again made a profound analysis of the bitter events in Hungary and in Poland. We openly expressed our views about the tense international situation at this period, spoke about the true causes of the disturbances which were occurring in the socialist camp, hit hard at the manoeuvres of imperialism, headed by American imperialism, exposed modern revisionism, and expressed and defended the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. The whole report, which I delivered at this plenum on behalf of the Political Bureau, opposed many of the theses of the 20th Congress, without mentioning it by name. Immediately after the plenum we made this report public, printed it in «Zëri i popullit» and broadcast it over the radio. Without doubt this infuriated the Khrushchevites. They were unable to oppose our principled theses and stands openly, because they were trying to preserve their disguise. Inwardly, however, they were seething. It was necessary to «settle matters» with us, to clamp down on us. They asked us to send a top level delegation to Moscow in the context of «strengthening our friendship».

We left for the Soviet Union in April 1957. The delegation consisted of Mehmet Shehu, Gogo Nushi, Rita Marko, Ramiz Alia, Spiro Koleka, Xhafer Spahiu, Behar Shtylla, me and others. Great astonishment : as soon as the ship on which we were travelling entered the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, a group of Soviet warships appeared, surrounded us, greeted us with flags, and escorted us to Odessa. The deputy prime minister of the Ukraine, the deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Patolichev, leaders of the party and the state of Odessa, and hundreds of people with flags and flowers had come to the port to welcome us. We stayed one day in Odessa, looked around the city, they took us to the ballet and that night we left by train for Moscow. At the Kiev station Kirichenko, Kalchenko (the prime minister of the Ukraine) and others were awaiting us. We had a cordial talk with them, they wished us a good trip and we went on our way. The atmosphere at the «Kievsky» railway station in Moscow was even warmer. Thousands and thousands of Moscovites, carrying flowers and flags, had turned out to welcome the arrival of the top level Albanian delegation and to express their sincere love and respect for our people, our Party and our country. I have felt this special love and respect of the Soviet people for us, built up in the years when Stalin was alive, whenever I have had the opportunity to come into contact with the rank-and-file Soviet people in industrial enterprises, collective farms, and the cultural, artistic and scientific centres, which I have visited. In our Party and people the ordinary Soviet people saw their true and sincere friends, saw a party and a people which whole-heartedly loved the Soviet Union and defended it with all their might, and which loved and honoured the names of Lenin and Stalin.

«Comrade Enver,» said Patolichev, «at this station we have welcomed other top level representatives of people's democracies, but a welcome like this, which the Soviet people are putting on for you, I have never seen before.»

Khrushchev, Bulganin, members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party. members of the government of the USSR, etc., were on the platform to welcome us. We shook hands and embraced them, and although their expressions of joy came nowhere near and could not be compared with those of the people, who continued to cheer round about us, still we noticed that this time the welcome of the Soviet leaders was several degrees warmer than on other occasions. Both at the station and at the reception to welcome us, they were unsparing with their flattering words.

«We are proud of the friendship we have with you; your Party is a young party but it has shown itself to be very mature; you are playing a very great role...» Khrushchev, Bulganin, Pospyelov and the others hastened to declare.

Very quickly we realized that this was the «carrot». They would bring out the stick a little later.

«We must assist you in a more organized way. We have given you something, but we have not thought well enough about what we have done,» said Khrushchev, trying to sweeten us up at the first priyom, and here, too, he did not forget to repeat his great «desire» that Albania should become an «example for the countries of Asia and Africa, for Greece and Italy.

After stressing several times «we shall assist you more» and «better», Khrushchev considered it appropriate to test the effect of his promises there and then.

«We roared with laughter in the Presidium,» he said, «when we read Tito's speech at Pula. He abused Comrade Enver there, but Tito's eyes have been blinded.

«We immediately gave him the reply he deserved,» I said.

«Of course, of course,» said Khrushchev and his smile faded, «but we must restrain our legitimate anger and show ourselves generous towards them, for the sake of the peoples of Yugoslavia and the unity of the camp.

«We shall go among the people and speak to them,» he continued, «we must show ourselves to. be reasonable. We should not mention the Yugoslavs by name, but should speak about revisionism, in general, as a phenomenon...»

It was the welcoming reception and I did not oppose him. However, the Yugoslav problem was to pursue us everywhere.

Two days later we went to Leningrad. Kozlov welcomed us with the friendliest words:

«I am crazy about Albania,» he told us. «I have become a great admirer of your country!» (It was this same Kozlov who, two or three years later, in the unforgettable events of Bucharest and Moscow, was to prove that he was such a great «admirer» of our country, that, apart from anything else, he threatened us with the loss of the freedom and independence of the Homeland, saying to us: «One atomic bomb dropped by the Americans would be enough to snuff out Albania and its population.»)

Amongst others we visited the «Lenin» machine-building plant, a big plant of historic importance. There, in the grave conditions of Czarism, Lenin had set up the first communist groups and had many times delivered speeches to the workers.

«No other foreign delegation has visited this plant,» said Pospyelov, who accompanied us on this visit.

The workers had not been prepared, because our visit was a spontaneous one, but they gave us a really warm welcome. One worker, who worked on a turbine for our hydro-power station on the Mat River, gave us some tools which we were to give as a souvenir to an Albanian worker. The workers of the plant to whom we talked, told us that they knew Albania, that they nurtured a special love for the Albanian people and considered them an heroic people, etc.

They immediately organized a rally at theplant, in which 4,000-5,000 people took part, and asked me to speak. I spoke and expressed the profound love and gratitude which the Albanian people and the Party of Labour of Albania nurtured for them and the whole Soviet people. I told them about the struggle of our people and Party against imperialist and revisionist enemies. These enemies were real, had names, had engaged in concrete activities against us. I had to speak openly to the workers, although this was not going to please Khrushchev. At the first reception he had given us his «orientation» on the question of Yugoslavia. But neither I nor my comrades would have had a clear conscience if we had not spoken out, therefore in my speech I told the workers that the Yugoslav leaders were anti-Marxists and chauvinists, that they had done hostile work, etc.

The workers listened to me attentively and cheered with great enthusiasm. However, after the meeting, Pospyelov said to me

«I think we should tidy up the part about Yugoslavia a little, because it seems to me a bit too hard-hitting.»

4,There is nothing exaggerated,» I said.

«Tomorrow your speech will be published in the press,» said Pospyelov. «The Yugoslavs will be very angry with us.»

«It's my speech. You are in order,» I said to him.

«Comrade Enver, you must understand us,» insisted Pospyelov. «Tito says that it is we who incite you to speak openly against them like this. We must soften that bit.»

This dialogue took place in one of the rooms of the «Kirov» Opera Theatre in Leningrad. It was time for the performance to begin, the people were waiting for us to enter the hall.

«Let us postpone this discussion till after the performance,» I said. .<Time is getting on.»

«We'll postpone the beginning of the performance,» he insisted, «I'll tell the comrades.»

We argued a bit and in the end we reached a «compromise»: the word «enemy» would be replaced with -anti-Marxistw.

The revisionists were jumping for joy as if they had gained the heavens. After a little reflection, Kozlov wanted another «concession»:

«'Anti-Marxist' does not sound too good either,» he said, «how about if we alter it to 'nonMarxist'.»

«All right, then,» I said in an ironical tone. «Do as you wish!»

«Let us go out to the foyer of the theatre,» Kozlov then proposed, and we circled once or twice among the people, so that Kozlov could greet them. Meanwhile the others went to make the «correction» and Ramiz accompanied them.

However, when Ramiz returned, he told me that they had removed all I had said about the Yugoslavs. I instructed him to tell them that we insisted on our opinions, but Khrushchev's men replied

«It is impossible to make any change now, because we would have to inform the comrades at the top again in order to do such a thing!»

In one of the intervals of the performance I expressed our dissatisfaction to Pospyelov.

«The truth is that they are what you say,» he told me, «but we must not be hasty, because the time will come. . .»

Thus, what I said at the meeting in connection with Yugoslavia, came out differently in «pravda». Mehmet, too, who had gone to Tashkent with a part of the delegation, was subjected to the same pressures and -operations» on his speeches.

Although the Soviet leaders were very well aware of our stand towards the Yugoslav revisionists, we had decided in advance to raise this problem in Moscow again and to tell Khrushchev and company why we disagreed with them. We met on April 15. Mehmet, Gogo, Ramiz, Spiro, Rita and I were at the talks from our side; from the Soviet side there were Khrushchev, Bulganin, Suslov, Ponomaryov, as well as Andropov. The latter, following the disturbances which occurred in Hungary, was now no longer an ambassador, but a top functionary in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party, I think a director or vice-director in the sector for relations with the parties of socialist countries.

Right from the outset, I told Khrushchev and his associates that I would speak mainly about the Yugoslav problem.

«We have discussed these matters continually in our Party,» I said amongst other things, -and have done our utmost to be as patient, coolheaded and prudent as possible in our opinions and actions towards the Yugoslav leadership.

«For their part, the Yugoslav leaders have gone on in the same old way. I do not intend to go over all the bitter history of our relations with them over 14 years, because you know about it, but I want to stress that, even to this day, the Yugoslav leadership is continuing its hostile secret activities against us and permanently maintains a provocative stand.

«We believe that these persistent stands on the part of the Yugoslav leadership, and especially on the part of their legation in Tirana,» I continued, «are intended to completely destroy relations with us in order to put us in a difficult position in regard to our friends, on the pretext that 'we have achieved good relations with all the other parties, while it is not possible to reach agreement with the Albanians'.»

I went on to tell them of new facts in connection with a number of activities of the minister and the secretary of the Yugoslav legation in Tirana, spoke about the underhand work they were doing to organize anti-party elements and activate them against our Party and people and told them of our efforts to make them stop their anti-Albanian activity.

«These activities cannot be done on their personal initiative,» I told Khrushchev, -but are done on the orders of the top Yugoslav leadership. This is the conclusion we have drawn from their actions.»

Further on, I raised the problem of the harmful activity which the Yugoslav leaders continued to carry out in Kosova.

«This is a delicate and important question for us,» I said, «because they are not only organizing intense activity against our country from Kosova, but are also trying to liquidate the Albanian population of Kosova, by displacing them en masse to Turkey and other countries.»

After speaking in detail about the efforts of the staff of the Yugoslav legation in Tirana to organize the internal enemies of our Party and people, about the plot they had tried to organize in the Tirana Conference in April 1956, and about the subsequent hostile activity with Tuk Jakova, Dali Ndreu, Liri Gega, etc., I pointed out:

«All these facts and others, of which we have ample, have convinced us that, to this very day; the Yugoslav leadership has never given up its aim of overthrowing the people's power in Albania. Thus, the Yugoslav revisionists are a danger, not only to our country but also to all the other socialist countries because, as they themselves have declared and as their activity towards us confirms, they are not reconciled to our socialist system, are opposed to the dictatorship of the proletariat and have totally abandoned Marxism Leninism.

-We have always wanted to have good relations with Yugoslavia,» I continued, «but to put it bluntly, we do not trust the Yugoslav leaders, because they speak against the social system in our countries and are opposed to the foundation of Marxism-Leninism. In all their propaganda, they do not say one word against imperialism, on the contrary, have joined the chorus of the Western powers against us. In 14 years, we have not seen the Yugoslav leadership make the slightest change that would make us think it has understood any of its grave mistakes and deviation's, which have long been under attack. Therefore, we cannot put any trust in this leadership.

«But what stand are we to maintain towards it?» I continued. «We shall keep our temper, we shall be patient and vigilant. But there is a limit to patience. We are not going to take any step which would damage the interests of socialism and Marxism-Leninism, we are not going to wage war on them and neither will we interfere in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. We are not and never have been for such actions, but we consider it our permanent duty to defend our correct ideological and political line and to unceasingly expose opportunism and revisionism.

«These were the things I had to tell you,» I said in conclusion. «In regard to our political situation, it is very good. The people stand firmly united around the Party and have mobilized themselves in the work to implement its line. That is all I have to say.»

Khrushchev, who up till now had listened in silence to what I presented, his face flushing red and turning pale alternately, although he managed to maintain his «aplomb», began to speak. Apparently he wanted to show us that «one can remain silent» even when one does not agree with what one's counter-part is saying.

«I wanted to stress our opinion,» he began. «We are in complete agreement with you and support you.»

Immediately after this phrase, however, Khrushchev showed us how they «supported» us:

«We thought that this party meeting would end more quickly and had no idea that you would present matters in this way.

«You are somewhat touchy in your view of relations with Yugoslavia,» he continued. «When you speak, you present the question of relations with Yugoslavia as hopeless. The way you speak about the Yugoslav leadership implies that this leadership has betrayed, that it is completely off the rails, that nothing can be done with it, and therefore we should break off relations. I do not think that it has betrayed, but it is true that it has slipped seriously from the course of Marxism Leninism. According to you, we ought to return to what Stalin did, which caused all these things we know about. If we take things as you present them, it turns out that Yugoslavia is against the Soviet Union, in the first place, and also against you and the others. When I listen to you speaking I see that you are seething with anger against them! The Italians, Greeks and Turks are no better than the Yugoslavs. I would like to ask you: With whom have you the best relations?»

«We have no relations with the Greeks and the Turks,» I replied.

«Let us examine how the Yugoslavs behave towards us,» he continued. «They attack us more than the Greeks, the Turks and the Italians! But there is something specific, proletarian, about Yugoslavia. Hence, can we break off relations with Yugoslavia?»

«We do not say this,» I replied.

«You did not say it but from your words it is obvious that you think it. Certainly Yugoslavia will not become the cause of a war against our camp, like Germany, Italy or any other country.

Do you consider Yugoslavia as the enemy number one?!» he asked me.

«We are not speaking about Yugoslavia. We are speaking about the revisionist activity of the Yugoslav leaders,» I said. «What are we to do after those things which they hatch up against us?»

«Try to neutralize their work. What else can you do? Are you going to war with them?» he asked me again.

«No, we have not made war on them and we are not going to do so. But if the Yugoslav minister goes tomorrow to photograph military objects, then what are we to do?»

«Take the film!» answered Khrushchev.

«They will use such a measure as a pretext to break off relations and put the blame on us, I said.

«Then what do you want from us, Comrade Enver?» he said angrily. «Our views differ from yours and we are unable to advise you! I do not understand you, Comrade Hoxha! Adenauer and Kishi are no better than Tito, but nevertheless, we are doing everything in our power for rapprochement with them. Do you think we are wrong?»

«This is not the same issue,» I replied. «When there is talk about Tito, the improvement of relations on the party road is implied, while he is an anti-Marxist. However, the Yugoslav leadership is not correct even in state relations. What stand are we to adopt, if the Yugoslavs continue to hatch up plots against us?»

«Comrade Hoxha,» shouted Khrushchev angrily, «you are constantly interrupting me. I listened to you for an hour without interrupting you once, while you do not allow me to speak even for a few minutes, but interrupt me continually! I have nothing more to say!» he declared and stood up.

«We have come to exchange opinions,» I said. «Then, as soon as you express an idea, you ask my opinion. Are you annoyed that I reply to you?!»

«I have told you and I am telling you again: I listened to you for an hour, Comrade Hoxha, while you did not listen to me even for a quarter of an hour but interrupted me again and again ! You want to build your policy on sentiments. You say there is no difference between Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, Popovic, and so on ! As we have told you previously, they are people and differ from one another. The Yugoslavs say that they are all of the same opinion, but we say otherwise: Tito and Rankovic maintain a different, more reasonable, more approachable stand towards us, while Kardelj and Popovic are totally hostile towards us. Tempo is an ass..., is unstable. Let us take Eisenhower and Dulles. They are both reactionaries, but we must not lump the two of them together. Dulles

is a savage war-monger, while Eisenhower is more human.

«We told you at the first meeting: we are not going to attack anyone and not going to provoke any attack. Our attacks and counter-attacks must be made in such a way as to ensure that they are in favour of rapprochement and not alienation.

«We have asked Zhou Enlai to become the intermediary to arrange a meeting between out parties in which the Yugoslavs will take part.* *( The reference is to Khrushchev's efforts, in collaboration with the Chinese leadership, to organize a meeting of all the communist parties of socialist countries in which Tito was to take part, too. This meeting was organized in Moscow in November 1957, but despite the efforts of Khrushchev and Mao Zedong, the Yugoslavs did not take part in it. For more details see this volume pp. 326-329.) He was pleased to undertake this task. Such a meeting can be held. The Yugoslavs have agreed to it. But it should not be thought that everything will be achieved at such a meeting. However, with opinions like yours, why should we go to such a meeting?! I do not understand what you are aiming at, Comrade Enver! Are you trying to convince us that we are not right?! Have you come here to convince us that we, too, should adopt the same stand as you towards Yugoslavia? No, we know what we are doing! Do you want to convince us that your line is right?! This does not lead to any good solution and is not in the interest of our camp. In connection with the counter-revolution in Hungary we have considered the stand of the Party of Labour of Albania correct, but your tactic in connection with Yugoslavia is wrong. I had thought that you should meet Micunovic (the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow), not to exacerbate relations but to improve them. However, seeing the way you treat the problem, I doubt that anything will emerge from it. You talk about the provocations of the Yugoslav minister in Tirana. In our country, too, the Yugoslav minister has gone in a demonstrative way to photograph military objects. Our militiaman took his camera and bid him good day!

«Let me repeat: we shall follow the line of improving both state relations and party relations with Yugoslavia. Whether or not we achieve it, that is another matter, but the fact is that we shall have a clear conscience and will serve our party and all the other parties well. We must not make matters worse. The Rumanian comrades are right in describing you in 'Scinteia' as 'quarrelsome'.»

«We are opposed not only to this grave insult, but also to the spirit in which a sister party, such as that of Rumania, deals with this problem in its central organ,» I told Khrushchev. «To be quarrelsome means that you make unprincipled attacks. We have never acted with anyone in this way. 'Scinteia' itself and those who wrote that interest of our camp. In connection with the counter-revolution in Hungary we have considered the stand of the Party of Labour of Albania correct, but your tactic in connection with Yugoslavia is wrong. I had thought that you should meet Micunovic (the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow), not to exacerbate relations but to improve them. However, seeing the way you treat the problem, I doubt that anything will emerge from it. You talk about the provocations of the Yugoslav minister in Tirana. In our country, too, the Yugoslav minister has gone in a demonstrative way to photograph military objects. Our militiaman took his camera and bid him good day!

«Let me repeat: we shall follow the line of improving both state relations and party relations with Yugoslavia. Whether or not we achieve it, that is another matter, but the fact is that we shall have a clear conscience and will serve our party and all the other parties well. We must not make matters worse. The Rumanian comrades are right in describing you in 'Scinteia' as 'quarrelsome'.»

«We are opposed not only to this grave insult, but also to the spirit in which a sister party, such as that of Rumania, deals with this problem in it5 central organ,» I told Khrushchev. «To be quarrelsome means that you make unprincipled attacks. We have never acted with anyone in this way. 'Scinteia' itself and those who wrote that agents on another occasion,» I said. «Nevertheless,

if you wish, I can give you endless details about their anti-party and anti-Albanian activity. They have acted continually to the detriment of our country.»

«Nevertheless, nevertheless!» shouted Khrushchev. «They should not have been condemned so severely. The Yugoslavs are furious.»

«Of course! They were their loyal agents,» I said, and I could see that Khrushchev had been just as infuriated by the verdict of our court as the Yugoslavs were.

«When we heard what you intended to do we sent an urgent radiogram to our ambassador in Tirana, Krylov. We told him that the decision of your court must be annulled without fail. Apparently, you did not listen to him. That order was ours.»

«I am hearing this for the first time and I am astonished that you could have given such an order,» I said, trying to control my anger. «However, you ought to know that during the trial the criminal activity of these dangerous agents was proved to the full. Our people would not pardon a soft stand towards them. We do not pat enemies on the head, but give them what they deserve, according to the laws for which the people have voted.»

Khrushchev was squirming in his seat.

«After Tito's speech at Pula,» put in Ponomaryov, «we sent a radiogram to Krylov, that he should tell you to keep cool in your reply, that we would publish an article and it should not appear as an organized action. We also told him what you should do about Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega.»

«He told us about the article,» I replied, «but we could not leave matters without replying to Tito, and therefore we wrote it. As for Dali Ndreu and Liri Gega, I know that your ambassador asked us after we arrested them and we told Krylov about the activity of those agents. He did not mention any kind of order, and it was just as well he did not. However, even if he had told us about it, we could never come out against the decision of the people's court.»

Turning to his comrades, Khrushchev said «Our ambassador has not carried out his task. That action should have been stopped.»

This individual always openly took our enemies under his protection, imagining Albania as a country in which his orders, and not the laws of our state, had to be applied. I remember that another time he said to me;

«I have received a letter from a person called Panajot Plaku, in which he asked me to help him.»

«Do you know this man?» I asked him. (I knew that he was well acquainted with the traitor and agent of the Yugoslavs, Panajot Plaku, a fugitive in Yugoslavia, who wanted to go to the Soviet Union.)

«No,» replied Khrushchev, «no, I do not know him.»

He was lying.

«He is a traitor,» I said, «and if you accept him in your country we shall break off our friendship with you. If you admit him you must hand him over to us to hang him publicly.

«You are like Stalin who killed people,» said Khrushchev.

«Stalin killed traitors, and we kill them, too,» I added.

Since there was nothing else he could do, he retreated. He still hoped to make us submit by using other ways and means. After pouring out all he had to say, he fell silent, laid his hands on the table, softened his stern tone and began his «advice» again.



The tactic of the «stick» was finished. At the discussion table Khrushchev again resorted to the «carrot».

«You must understand us, comrades,» he said, «we speak in this way only with you, because we love you greatly, you are close to our hearts,» etc., etc. And after all this he made a gesture of «generosity»: he excused us from repaying the credits, which the Soviet Union had provided for our country up to the end of 1955 for its economic and cultural development. Of course, we thanked them, thanked the Soviet working class and the fraternal Soviet people, in the first place, for this aid which they gave a small, but valiant, industrious and indomitable country. However, we all clearly understood what «motives» lay behind this «generosity» of Khrushchev. He wanted to «smooth us overN, to relieve the tense atmosphere which had been created during the talk, to some extent, wanted to bribe us with this «aid,» which to Khrushchev was not aid but charity, a bait which he threw us to deceive us and make us submit to him. However, he was soon to be convinced that we were the sort of people who would even accept to eat grass but would never bend the knee to him or any other traitor.

A few days after this «generous» gesture, Khrushchev also invited Micunovic to a big dinner for our delegation. He saw him standing somewhat apart and called to him:

Come over here! Why do you stand so far off?!

He introduced us and laughing said to us:

«Try to understand each other!» And off he went, glass in hand, leaving us «to understand each other». We quarrelled.

I reeled off to Micunovic all the things I had told Khrushchev at the meeting and said to him

«We have been and are ready to improve our state relations and, for our part, have made every effort, but you must give up your anti-Albanian activity once and for all.»

«You call us revisionists,» said Micunovic. «How can you have relations with revisionists?»

«No,» I said, «we shall never have relations with revisionists, but I am speaking about state relations. We can and should have such relations. In regard to the ideological contradictions which exist between us, you must understand clearly that we will never give up the struggle against opportunism and the revision of Marxism Leninism.»

«When you speak of revisionism you have us in mind,» said Micunovic.

«That is true,» I said, «whether or not we mention Yugoslavia, the reality is that we are referring to you, too.»

Micunovic stuck to his point of view. The debate was becoming heated. Watching us from a distance, Khrushchev sensed the mounting tension and rejoined us.

Micunovic began to repeat to him what he had said to me previously, and continued to make accusations against us. However, at that dinner we had Khrushchev -on our side».

«When Tito was in Corfù,» he said to Micunovic, «the King of Greece said to him: 'Well, shall we divide up Albania?' Tito did not reply, while the Queen pointed out that they 'should not talk about such things.»

Micunovic lost his head and said:

«That was only a joke.»

«Such jokes should never be made, especially with the monarcho-fascists, who have been claiming Southern Albania throughout their existence. And you have made similar 'jokes' before this too,» I told him. -We have a document of Boris Kidric in which he has included Albania as the 7th republic of Yugoslavia.»

.«This was something done by one individual,» replied Micunovic.

«One individual, true, but he was a member of the Political Bureau of your party and chairman of the State Planning Commission,» said Mehmet.

This was too much for Micunovic and he walked away. Khrushchev took me by the arm and asked me:

«How did this come about? Did you quarrel again?»

«How else could it go? Only badly, as with the revisionists.

«You Albanians astound me,» he said. «You are stubborn.»

«No,» I said, «we are Marxists.»

We parted displeased with each other. But Khrushchev was versatile in his scheming. As I have said, sometimes he softened the situation with Tito, sometimes he exacerbated it. When things were tense with Tito he was gentle with us. I remember when Khrushchev spoke at the 7th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he attacked Tito in strong terms and everyone applauded him. When we came out at the interval, all the heads of the delegations went to a room to drink coffee. There Khrushchev said:

«And for all I said about Tito, Comrade Enver Hoxha is still not satisfied.»

«You are right,» I said, Tito must be exposed more vigorously and ceaselessly.»

However, it was not always like this. Before Khrushchev came to visit Albania in May 1959, the Soviet leadership sent us a radiogram in which it informed us that «for understandable reasons he will not touch on the Yugoslav question in his speeches and hopes hat in their speeches the Albanian friends will bear this properly in mind.»

This was a condition which they imposed on us and they were awaiting our reply. We discussed this problem at length in the Political Bureau, where all of us expressed our regret and anger over such a visit with conditions and made a balance of the benefits and evils which would result from our acceptance or non-acceptance of Khrushchev's condition. We knew that the Yugoslavs and all reaction would rub their hands and declare:

«See, Khrushchev went to Albania and shut the Albanians' mouths. And where? In their own home!»

However, the visit to Albania of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was of

special importance for strengthening the international position of our country.

Therefore we decided unanimously to agree to Khrushchev's condition just for the days that he would stay in Albania and as soon as he left Albania we would continue our unwavering fight as before against the Yugoslav revisionists. Fearing that something might occur as in Leningrad in April 1957, as soon as he arrived in our country on his visit at the end of May 1959, Khrushchev

spoke first, without waiting for me to welcome him, saying:

«You must know that I am not going to speak against Tito.»

«We consider a guest a guest and impose nothing on him,» I replied.

I spoke, said what we had to say, naturally in a friendly manner, but he did not fail to grasp the allusions.

Nevertheless we behaved in a friendly way with him and tried to create the best possible impressions about our country and our people. On every occasion he behaved as was his habit: sometimes with jokes and sometimes in a grave tone he poured out all he had in mind.

We talked about our economic problems.

Besides information about the achievements up to date, I was speaking about our prospects for the future. Among the main branches I mentioned oil, and informed him that in recent days we had struck a new gusher of oil.

«Is that so?» he said. «But what quality is it? I know you have bad, heavy oil. Have you calculated how much it will cost to process it? Then, where will you sell it? Who needs your oil?».

I went on to speak about our mining industry and its very good prospects, mentioning our iron nickel, chromium and copper ores.

«We have ample amounts of these minerals and we think that we should follow the course of processing them at home. We have raised the necessity for building the metallurgical industry in Albania with you last year and several times in the meetings of Comecon,» I said. «Up till now we have received no positive replay, but we are persisting.»

«Metallurgical plants?» he interrupted me. «I agree, but have you considered the matter well? Have you calculated what a ton of smelted metal will cost you? If it is going to cost you dear it is no good to you. I repeat: one day's production in our country will fulfil all your needs for several years.»

This is how he replied to all our requests and problems.

When I finished, Khrushchev began to speak :

«Comrade Enver's exposé made the situation in your country clearer to us,» he said. «However, in regard to your needs, I want to tell you that we have not come to examine them. We have not been authorized by our government to discuss such matters. We have come to get to know you, to exchange opinions.»

Then laughing, he cracked a joke which was not simply a joke:

«We think that things are going well with you. Albania has advanced, and if you offered us a loan we would accept it with the greatest of pleasure.»

«We have ample stones, sea and air,» put in Mehmet in the same tone.

«We have much more of those than you. Have you any dollars?» asked Khrushchev, and then, in a different tone:

«Enough of this,» he said. The truth is that you have made progress, but you are not satisfied. We gave you a credit last year and now you want another one. But we have a popular saying: 'Cut your coat according to your cloth'.»

«We have the same saying,» I said, «and we know it and implement it well.»

«But,» he said, «you are asking for credits again.» He shrugged his shoulders, was silent for a moment and resumed his jocular tone:

«Or is it that you gave us a good lunch and thought it a fine opportunity to ask us for another credit? If we had known this we would have brought our own lunch.»

«The Albanians have a special respect for a guest,» I said. «Whether they have plenty and whether they have nothing, they always provide for their guest. They treat him with every respect when he comes to their home and even swallow something that they do not like.»

«I was joking,» he said and burst into a laugh. But it was more a snarl than a laugh. Wherever he went he criticized us. About the big vineyards at Shtoi he said:

«Why do you throw your money away? You will get nothing from this land.»

Regardless of the opinions of this «agricultural expert», however, we continued the work and now the vineyards at Shtoi are marvellous.

He criticized the work to drain the Tërbuf swamp. In Vlora he 'summoned the main Soviet oil expert in our country and he, no doubt «well prepared» by the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, delivered a report in our presence which was extremely pessimistic, saying that Albania had no oil. However, a group of Albanian. oil experts also came there and refuted what the Soviets said with many facts and arguments. They spoke in detail about the history of the oil industry in our country, about the great interest of the foreign imperialist companies in Albanian oil in the past and about the great and encouraging results which had been achieved in the 15 years of the people's power. Mehmet, for his part, spoke in detail about the great prospects for oil extraction in Albania and also mentioned to Khrushchev the recent discoveries in this field.

«Fine, fine,» repeated Khrushchev, -but yours is a heavy oil and contains sulphur. Have you calculated things properly? You will process it, but a litre of benzine will cost you more than a kilogram of caviar. You must look closely at the commercial aspect. It has not been decreed that you must have everything yourselves. What are your friends for?!»

In Saranda he advised us to plant only oranges and lemons for which the Soviet Union had great need.

«We shall supply you with wheat. The mice in our country eat as much wheat as you need,» he said, repeating what he had said in Moscow in 1957. He also gave us a lot of «advice».

«Don't waste your land and marvellous climate on maize and wheat. They bring you no income. The bay-tree grows here. But do you know what it is? Bay is gold. Plant thousands of hectares of bay because we shall buy it from you.»

He went on with peanuts, tea and citrus fruit.

«These are what you should plant,- he said. «In this way Albania will become a flourishing garden !»

In other words he wanted Albania to be turned into a fruit-growing colony which would serve the revisionist Soviet Union, just as the banana republics in Latin America serve the United States of America.

But we could never allow ourselves to take this suicidal course which Khrushchev advised. He even criticized our archaeological work as «dead things». When he visited Butrint he said:

«Why do you employ all these forces and funds on such dead things! Leave the Hellenes and the Romans to their antiquity!»

«Apart from the Hellenic and Roman culture,» I told him, «another ancient culture, the Illyrian culture, developed and flourished in these zones. The Albanians stem from the Illyrian trunk and our archaeological studies are confirming and providing evidence of our centuries-long history and of the rich and ancient culture of a valiant, industrious and indomitable people, »

However, Khrushchev was truly an ignoramus in these fields. He could see only the «profitability»:

«Why are these things of value to you? Do they increase the well-being of the people?» he asked me. He called Malinovsky, at that time minister of defence, who was always at hand

«Look, how marvellous this is!» I heard them whisper. «An ideal base for our submarines could be built here. These old things should be dug up and thrown into the sea (they were referring to the archaeological finds at Butrint). We can tunnel through this mountain to the other side,» and he pointed to Ksamil. «We shall have the most ideal and most secure base in the Mediterranean. From here we can paralyze and attack everything.»

They were to repeat the same thing in Vlora a day or two later. We had come out on the verandah of the villa at Uji i Ftohtë.

«Marvellous, marvellous!» Khrushchev cried and turned to Malinovsky. I thought he was referring to the truly breath-taking landscape of our Riviera. But their mind was working in another direction

«What a secure bay at the foot of these mountains!» they said. «With a powerful fleet, from here we can have the whole of the Mediterranean, fr om Bosporus to Gibraltar, in our hands ! We can control everyone.»

It made my flesh creep to hear them talk like this, as if they were the masters of the seas, countries and peoples. «No, Nikita Khrushchev,» I said to myself, «we shall never allow you to set out to enslave other countries and shed their peoples' blood from our territory. You will never have Butrint, Vlora, or any inch of the Albanian territory, to use for those evil purposes.»

The fictitious «peace» was being more and more thoroughly rocked to its foundations. Khrushchev and his followers were seeing our resistance ever more clearly and tried to make us yield by exerting economic pressure, while secretly orchestrating a discrimination against our leadership by means of their specialists who were working in all sectors in our country, such as in oil and the economic enterprises in which we lacked sufficient experience, in the army, where we had advisers, etc. The Soviet Embassy, with its innumerable «councillors», who were diplomats only in name, because in reality they were security officers, maintained contact with all these «experts», and gave them the necessary instructions. The first thing they did was to issue instructions to the Soviet experts in the economy to neglect their work in Albania. To a greater or lesser degree, these experts began to become more interested in buying suit lengths and other things, which they sent to the Soviet Union to sell on the black market, than in working with our comrades.

Those experts who remained sincere with us were removed by the embassy, one after the other, on fabricated pretexts and against their will. When they parted from our people, these specialists expressed their dissatisfaction. Those who remained in Albania, of course, had received orders to sabotage the key sectors of our economy, especially the oil industry and geological prospecting. As was proved later, the Soviet oil «experts» had recruited some agents from the rank's of our geologists and, as they themselves eventually admitted, had charged them with the mission of keeping from our Party and Government accurate

data about the discoveries which they made, of hiding the results of these discoveries, of using all the means of sabotage, so as to make us start drilling in the wrong places, of violating the rules of prospecting and extracting technique and wasting

hundreds of millions of leks, etc. The Khrushchevite revisionists taught the agents they had recruited in our country various methods of sabotage. And the agents carried out the instructions of

their patrons. These oil «experts» and «geologists» made two reports: an accurate one, with exact and positive data on discoveries of different minerals, and a false one, which said that the prospecting had allegedly yielded negative results, i.e., the minerals sought were not discovered. The first report was sent to Moscow and Leningrad through the KGB centre, which was called the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, and the second report was sent to our Ministry of Industry and Mines. This whole vile business was discovered and proved after the Soviets cleared out of Albania. Convinced that there had been sabotage, our Central Committee gave orders that the reports must be studied, that our geological teams must go to all those places where the Soviet saboteurs had said the results were negative, and begin prospecting. This was done. Precisely in those places where they had declared «there was nothing», we found oil, chromium, copper, iron-nickel, coal, etc.

This was an economic pressure which they exerted on us in order to force us to accept their views. But they broke their heads. Our Party's resistance steadily increased, but still without burning the bridges. The Soviet revisionists also operated prudently to avoid burning the bridges with us. The Soviet ambassador came frequently to sound us out on some international problems on which I would give my opinion frankly, or to learn about some internal matter and I filled him up with reports about the weather, about the planting, about the harvests, and about some general decision of the Party about economic and cultural matters.

Such were the Soviet ambassadors after Khrushchev mounted the throne. They thought we were blind. They never expressed any opinion on the questions we asked them. On these occasions their stand was: «I shall inform you,» or «I shall ask Moscow-. Their task was that of the informer. They rarely had any understanding of the problems of our industry and agriculture.

The Soviet ambassador Krylov, who preceded Ivanov in Albania, visited some regions of Southern Albania. When he returned he paid me a visit.

«Are you satisfied with what you saw?» I asked him.

He said nothing concrete, because it was dangerous to tell me about the things he had gone to see there. All he said was something ... .«colossal».

«I have noticed that you keep many dogs in the villages and in the towns and I have made a calculation that there could be such and such a number of dogs in Albania, which must eat such and such quantity of food..., and if this food is reckoned in grain it comes to such and such a number of quintals.»

«Well, well,» I said to myself. «Look what an ambassador they have sent us!» And I said to him:

«You may be right, but in our country you don't find barber's shops and restaurants for dogs as in Paris. But what measures do you advise, Comrade Ambassador?»

«You should kill them!» he said.

«The 'Society for the Protection of Animals' will protest, as they are accusing us enough already about killing traitors and agents of reaction,» I said.

This same ambassador once told me not to speak in harsh terms about Tito in a meeting of the People's Assembly. I replied:

«Comrade ambassador, I do not take orders from anyone except from my Party.»

«We understand this, but if Tito is going to be attacked I shall not attend the meeting of the Assembly,» he protested.

«Tito will be exposed even more than from what I have written and the session of the People's Assembly will open even if you do not come,. I said.

And the «famous» Soviet ambassador came to the Assembly and tucked himself away in a corner of the box, behind other ambassadors, which was not his place.

It was clear that this threatening gesture of the ambassador, which we slapped back, came from Moscow.

After a short time the «adviser» on the extermination of dogs in Albania was recalled from Tirana and became a director in the Central Committee of Khrushchev's communist party!

Day by day, Khrushchev and his gang were increasing their pressure on us in the direction of the economy. Not only did they not provide us with all the aid we sought, but even what they did provide was quite insufficient. They supplied only a few cases of tractor spare parts, which they sent by aircraft. In this way they sought to force us to our knees, but in vain, because they had no success. To put pressure on us to accept their conditions, Khrushchev said to us once (while we were talking about our economic problems): «In our relations with the Yugoslavs it has always been our principle to give them half of what they ask for. When they behave well we act more generously. This is how we act with all those who behave badly towards us.» The implication was quite clear, they were openly putting pressure on us. We quarrelled so fiercely that time that the talks were almost broken off.

All over the country the Soviets began to commit many provocations against our people everyday. Once, a person complained to the head of his office that a Soviet «expert» had made a proposition to recruit him as an agent. Our comrade refused indignantly. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested to the Soviet Embassy about this. Naturally, the embassy denied that there were such people among the Soviet experts, but a few weeks later it removed its exposed agent from the country. This was the first time we had to do with such a denunciation and therefore our Party and Government recommended vigilance, prudence and the greatest cool-headedness. It was quite obvious that with the passage of time the situation was getting worse, although the leadership in Moscow preserved the external forms of «friendship».

For us, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was finished. Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites were revisionists, traitors. War would be declared. The time of the declaration of war was only a matter of months, while our relations continued to hang on a thread.





12. FROM BUCAREST TO MOSCOW

February 1960: Mikoyan on the ChineaeSoviet differences. Exacerbation of the situation between Moscow and Beijing. Kosygin paya a «visit» to Mehmet Shehu in Moscow. The Bucharest plot. Hysni Kapo does not bat an eyelid at Khrushchev's pressure. The Soviets set their secret agents in motion and establish the blockade to starve us. The struggle in the preparatory commission for the Moscow Meeting. Our delegation in Moscow. Icy atmosphere. The Soviet Gargantuas. Pressure, flattery, provocations again. The Kremlin marshals. A brief meeting with Andropov. Khrushchev's tactic: «There should be no polemics.» The mercenaries react against our speech. The last talks with the Khrushchevite renegades.

All the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, who were at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, know the stand of our Party in connection with the diabolical plot which the Khrushchevites had hatched up there. I shall not go into details here because Volume 19 of my Works tells about the struggle of our Party, which opened fire on the Khrushchevites and fought with revolutionary Marxist-Leninist courage.

Judging from the aims which the Khrushchevites sought to achieve, politically, ideologically and organizationally, the Bucharest Meeting was a Trotskyite, anti-Marxist, revisionist putsch. From the .form of its organization too, this meeting was a plot from start to finish.

The revisionist renegades needed another meeting of international communism to gain approval for their old plan for the final legitimization of modern revisionism, which was defeated at the Moscow Meeting in 1957. Therefore they raised the need for the organization of a new meeting of communist and workers' parties, where we would allegedly discuss the «problems of the movement», which had come up since the previous meeting in 1957. To this end, at the beginning of June 1960, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent us a letter in which it was proposed that the meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the countries of the socialist camp should be held, taking advantage of the occasion of the 3rd Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party. We replied to this proposal in positive terms and decided to send a delegation, which I was to head.

Meanwhile we had been informed about the disagreements which had developed between the Soviets and the Chinese. In February that year, Mehmet and I went to Moscow for a consultation of the representatives of parties of the socialist countries about the development of agriculture, as well as for a meeting of the political consultative committee of the Warsaw Treaty. As soon as we arrived at Moscow airport, a functionary of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Soviet party introduced himself to me.

«I have been sent by Cornrade Mikoyan, who wants to meet you personally tomorrow morning about a very important matter,» he told me.

This urgency surprised me, because Mikoyan could have met me later. We were to stay several days in Moscow. Nevertheless I said

«All right, but I shall bring Comrade Mehmet with me.»

«They told me the invitation was only for you,» replied Mikoyan's chinovnik, but I repeated

«No, I shall come together with Comrade Mehmet.»

I insisted on taking Mehmet with me because I guessed that in this urgent meeting about a «very important problemN, Mikoyan would speak to me about complicated and delicate matters. The fact that I was well-acquainted with Mikoyan and his anti-Marxìst and anti-Albanian stands made me all the more determined.

The next day we went to meet Mikoyan in his villa in Leninskie Gori. After the usual greetings, Anastasiy entered directly into the theme of the talk

«I am going to inform you about the disagreements we have with the Communist Party of China, I stress, with the Communist Party of China. We had decided to tell these things only to the first secretaries of the sister parties. Therefore, I ask Comrade Mehmet, not to misunderstand us, but this is what we had decided and not that we did not trust him.»

«Not at all,» replied Mehmet. «Indeed I can leave.»

«No,» said Mikoyan, «stay!»

Then Mikoyan spoke to us at length about the differences with the Chinese party.

Mikoyan spun his tale in such a way as to create the impression that they themselves stood in principled Leninist positions and were fighting the deviations of the Chinese leadership. Amongst other things, Mikoyan used as arguments several theses of the Chinese which, in fact, for us, too, were not right from the viewpoint of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Thus, Mikoyan mentioned the pluralist theories of «one hundred flowers», the question of the cult of Mao, the «great leap forward», etc.

Of course, we had our own reservations about these things, to the extent that we were acquainted with the activity and concrete practice of the Communist Party of China at that time.

«We have Marxism-Leninism and do not need any other theory,» I told Mikoyan, «while as to the 'one hundred flowers' we have neither accepted this view nor have we ever mentioned it.»

Among other things, Mikoyan spoke about Mao and compared him with Stalin, saying:

HThe only difference between Mao Zedong and Stalin is that Mao does not cut off the heads of his opponente, while Stalin did. That is why we could not oppose Stalin,» continued this revisionist. «At one time, together with Khrushchev we had considered organizing a pokushenie* *( assassination attempt (Russian in the original).) against him, but we gave up the idea because we were afraid that the people and the party would not understand.»

We made no pronouncement about the problems which Mikoyan raised, and after we had heard him out, I said

«The major differences which have arisen between you and the Communist Party of China are very serious matters and we do not understand why they have been allowed to reach this point. This is neither the time nor the place to discuss them. We think that they should be solved between your parties.»

«That is what we shall do,» 'said Mikoyan, and just as we were parting he asked us: «Please don't discuss these matters I raised with you, even with the members of your Political Bureau.»

From this meeting we understood that the differences and contradictions had come to a head and were serious. Since we were already acquainted with Khrushchev and Mikoyan, we were quite clear that they did not proceed from principled positions in the accusations they were making against the Chinese party.

As became even clearer later, the differences were over a series of matters of principle towards which, at that time, the Chinese seemed to maintain correct stands. Both in the official speeches of the Chinese leaders and in their published articles, especially in the one entitled «Long Live Leninism», the Chinese party treated the problema in a theoretically correct way and opposed the Khrushchevites. This was particularly damaging to the latter and therefore they were trying to forestall the evil.

We discussed what Mikoyan told us only with the comrades of the Bureau, because the matter was extremely delicate and we had to act with caution and patience. Then there was also the request of the Soviet leadership that this problem should be kept secret.

Thus, on the eve of the Bucharest Meeting we had been informed of the Sino-Soviet differences.

At that time, I think, at the end of May or the beginning of June, Gogo Nushi, who was in Beijing at a meeting of the General Council of the World Federation of the Trade Unions, informed us by radiogram of the contradictions which had erupted in Beijing between the Chinese and the Soviet delegations. The Chinese delegation to the meeting opposed many theses of the report which was to be delivered, because in essence they were nothing but Khrushchev's revisionist theses about «peaceful coexistence», war and peace, the seizure of power in a « peaceful way», etc.

The Chinese invited the heads of several delegations (those who were members of the leaderships of the communist and workers' parties) to a dinner, which they wanted to turn into a meeting, at which they would once again express their views in connection with the erroneous theses of the draft-report of the meeting. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping spoke first, followed by Zhou Enlai.

Gogo Nushi's stand was that these things should not be discussed at that gathering, but should be settled through party channels, because the delegations had gone to attend the meeting of the General Council of the Trade Unions and not to discuss those matters. Many of the other delegations were of the same view. As a result, Zhou Enlai retreated and caid: «All right, we shall $nd another occasion.»

All these things, together with what Mikoyan had told us in Moscow in February, as well as the indirect attacks which were being exchanged in the Soviet and Chinese press, showed that matters were being exacerbated in a way which was not at all Marxist-Leninist. The indications were that the joint meeting which was to be held in Bucharest, to which we had agreed to go, might reach an impasse or be a complete failure.

In this situation, a few days after the first letter we received another letter from the Central Committee of the Soviet party, which said that several parties proposed that the meeting of the communist and workers' parties should be postponed and that the parties of the countries of the socialist camp should meet in Bucharest only to set the date and place of the future meeting of all parties. «Apart from setting the date and the place, at this meeting,» said the Soviets, «opinions could be exchanged without taking any decision.>,. We agreed on this proposal and decided to send a party delegation to Bucharest, headed by Comrade Hysni Kapo, to take part, both in the congress of the Rumanian party and in the joint meeting to set the date and the place for the coming meeting.

Why did I not go to Bucharest? I, personally, and the other comrades of the Political Bureau who knew about it, suspected that the problem of the differences which had emerged between China and the Soviet Union would be discussed there. We were not in agreement with such a thing because, first, we had heard only of one side of the argument, the Soviet side, and were not acquainted with the objections of the Chinese; second, the differences had to do with cardinal problems of the theory and practice of the international communist movement and we could not go to a meeting of such responsibility and make pronouncements without discussing and deciding our stand in the plenum of the Central Committee. However, we were unable to do this, because such problems could not be put forward in the Central Committee hastily. They had to be thrashed out thoroughly, had to be studied carefully, and time was required for this.

Therefore our Party sent Comrade Hysni Kapo to Bucharest to discuss only the date of the future meeting, as well as to take part in the free exchange of views on problems of the international situation after the failure of the Paris Conference, as our parties had agreed.

As we saw later, the Bucharest Meeting was to be transformed into a plot, which the Khrushchevites had prepared in advance. In our direction, too, intensified efforts were made, sometimes openly, sometimes in disguised form (because the Khrushchevites knew how our Party adhered to principle), in order to involve us in that plot.

When Comrade Gogo Nushi was returning to Albania from Beijing, in Moscow Brezhnev, who at that time had become chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, sought a meeting with him. Gogo met Brezhnev, who spoke to him at length about the differences with the Chinese.

Four to five days before the meeting in Bucharest began, when Hysni and I were discussing the stand he was to take in the congress of the Rumanian party, we received a radiogram from Mehmet, who had been for some days in Moscow for medical treatment. In the radiogram Mehmet informed us about an unexpected «visit» which Kosygin had paid him. When he saw him come in, Mehmet was surprised and thought it was a courtesy visit, although somewhat late.

«Comrade Mehmet, I have come to talk about a very important matter,» said Kosygin, without even bothering to inquire about his health, although he knew very well that Mehmet had gone there for medical treatment.

«Go ahead,» said Mehmet.

Kosygin spoke for an hour and a half about the contradictions they had with the Communist Party of China. Mehmet listened and listened and then said:

«All these things you have told me are very grave. We are astonished that they have been allowed to become as serious as this.»

«We are not going to make any concession to the Chinese,» said Kosygin.

«We told Mikoyan, when he informed Comrade Enver and me about this business, that these things should be solved between the two parties,» said Mehmet.

«We are not going to make any concession at all,» repeated Kosygin, and added, «We were very pleased with the courageous, heroic stand of Comrade Belishova in the talks with the Chinese in Beijing. The counsellor of our embassy in Beijing informed us of what she had told him after the talks with the Chinese.»

Mehmet still had no knowledge of these actions and intrigues of Liri Belishova, but he told Kosygin coldly and bluntly:

«I do not know what Liri Belishova has told you because I have been here. I know that when we talked with Mikoyan, he instructed us not to discuss these matters with anyone. Our opinion has been and is that these things should be settled between your two parties. But since they are not being settled in this way, then they should be placed before the meeting of the parties. The stand of our Party will be Marxist-Leninist and not opportunist or sentimental.»

Kosygin got up scowling and when he was about to go out the door, Mehmet dealt him a slap «Comrade Kosygin,» he said quietly, «you did not give me the opportunity to ask you - how is your health?»

Kosygin turned back, and, as if to excuse himself, he, too, asked Mehmet how he was feeling.

«I am very well,» said Mehmet, without prolonging the subject, and immediately after this conversation he stopped the treatment and made arrangements to return home by aircraft the following day.

Now everything had been made clear to us: Khrushchev was preparing the Bucharest plot and wanted to manipulate us, to compel us at all costs to agree with his revisionist views and stands.

Here in Tirana, too, the Soviet Ambassador, Ivanov, came almost every other day, sometimes to bring some book catalogue, sometimes for some unimportant information, but in fact, he came to sound us out, to learn whether I would go to Bucharest, what stand we would take, etc., etc. However I sent him off with the usual talk without telling him anything apart from what was known officially.

I remember that in the middle of June, Ivanov came to me in my office to «inform» me of a news item which I had heard two or three hours earlier over the radio. I understood that he was after something else, as usual. It was the period when the Soviets and Khrushchev were giving great publicity to the Paris Summit Conference, which was to bring «peace» to mankind. If I am not mistaken, Khrushchev had already gone to Paris, although the U-2 incident, in which an American spy-plane was shot -down by a Soviet missile, had occurred.

«What is your opinion of the Paris Conference?» Ivanov asked me.

.kSince they have gone there let them meet,» I said, «but in our opinion nothing will come out of this conference. The imperialists are what they have always been, aggressive and dangerous to the peoples and the socialist countries. Thus, I do not think that the Paris Conference will yield any result.»

A.fter two days or so the conference burst like a bubble, because the Americans not only did not apologize, but, on the contrary, déclared that they would continue their espionage, and Khrushchev was obliged to go home after hurling a few «smoke bombs» against the imperialists. Ivanov came back and said to me:

«Things turned out just as you said, Comrade Enver! Did you read Khrushchev's statements?[».

«I read them,» I replied. «And that is üow he should always speak against the imperialists, because they have not become 'reasonable' and 'peace-loving', and never can do so.»

Such was the situation on the eve of the Bucharest meeting, which, from beginning to end, was to remain a blot on the history of the international communist and workers' movement. The Khrushchevites were organizing it allegedly to set the date of the future meeting, but the setting of the date was a formality. The Khrushchevites had another objective. What was important to them was the taking of a series of decisions to go «as a bloc» to the future meeting of all parties. «As a bloc», according to them, meant to go closely united around the Khrushchevite revisionists in order to give unquestioning support to their betrayal of the Marxist-Leninist theory and the correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist practice in all international and national problems. In short, Khrushchev thought that the time had come to e5tablish his iron law over the herd he wanted to command.

However, the Khrushchevites were seeing and were convinced that two parties, in particular, the Party of Labour of Albania and the Communist Party of China, were not joining this herd, which they wanted to have completely under their control. What is more, in our resolute and principled stand they saw the danger of the exposure and defeat of their secret counter-revolutionary plans. Therefore Khrushchev had made his calculations like this: in order to make the meeting of all parties a meeting of «unity» and «solidarity», that is, total submission, accounts first had to be 'settled with Albania and China. Since he was an inveterate revisionist, Khrushchev's logic went even further: «As to the Party of Labour of Albania,» he deceived himself, «I shall leave it aside for the time being, will not attack it directly, because after all it is a small party of a small country. The Albanians are stubborn,» he thought, «they will get angry and jump up and down, but in the end they will surrender, because they have no one else to turn to. Whatever they do, I have them in my pocket.» This was his revisionist superpower logic. China remained the urgent problem for Khrushchev. This is how he saw things: «Either China will submit and quietly and tamely join the herd, or I shall condemn it and throw it out of the camp forthwith. In this way I condemn China as a splitter, and neutralize the Party of Labour of Albania, and I tighten the screws on any other head-strong element who wants to kick out.» In short, Khrushchev had to have a preliminary meeting to clamp down on the «disobedient», so that the future meeting would be crowned by «unity» without any splits. This is why he wanted and organized the meeting at Bucharest.

All the parties of the European people's democracies sent their first secretaries to Bucharest, therefore Khrushchev was not pleased that I did not go and asked:

«Why hasn't Comrade Enver come? Could you inform him that he should come?»

Hysni told him:

«Comrade Enver is not coming now. He will come to the meeting of parties, the time and place of which we shall decide here.»

At first we knew nothing about what Khrushchev and company were hatching up in Bucharest. However, the first radiograms from Hysni soon arrived. All we had foreseen was being confirmed. The Bucharest Meeting, which set out to decide a date, was ending up in a crusade. Khrushchev insisted that the disagreements between the Soviet Union and China should be raised and discussed at the meeting, of course, in the direction and the way he wanted. «Decisions can be taken» at this meeting, said Khrushchev, and demanded that the other parties speak about the -grave mistakes of China», express solidarity with the Soviets and -come out with a common stand». I was completely convinced that we were facing one of the most perfidious and savage plots and immediately raised the question in the Political Bureau.

These were days and nights of ceaseless, careful, intensive work, well-considered and thrashed out from all angles. The dice had been cast, the «peace» with the Khrushchevites had come to an end. They had opened fire and we would reply to their fire with all our strength. Now there was not and could not be any further conciliation arid tactical «agreement» with the Khrushchevites. The great fight had begun. It would be a great and extremely difficult fight, full of sacrifices and repercussions, but we would carry on to the end with confidence and optimism, because we knew that right was on our side, on the side of Marxism-Leninism.

Everyone knows how the meeting developed: a voluminous material from the Soviets against China was handed out quickly, it was decided that the meeting of the parties of the camp would

be held a few hours later, and then all the heads of the delegations of the communist and workers' parties that took part in the congress of the Rumanian party would be brought together and Khrushchev would conf ront them with his desire that the «Communist Party of China should be condemned as anti-Marxist, as a Trotskyite party,» etc., etc.

In the former meeting which was organized by Khrushchev, Comrade Hysni Kapo, in the name of the Party and on the basis of detailed directives, which we sent him every day and frequently twice a day, attacked Khrushchev and the others for their anti-Marxist aims and the conspiratorial methods which they used, defended the Communist Party of China and opposed the continuation of such a meeting.

Khrushchev did not expect this. In the meetings which were held he talked all the time, stamping his feet and thumping his fist, became angry and spluttered with indignation. But Comrade Hysni Kapo, armed with the correo line





of our Party and the special instructions we sent him continually, and with his charasteristic coolness and courage, not only did not yield, but gave Khrushchev as good as he got with his cutting replies.

In appearance Khrushchev aimed his many speeches at Peng Chen, who was the leader of the Chinese delegation, but always f ound the occasion to attack our Party and its representative. His aim was not only to attack our resolute stand, but also to say to the representatives of the other parties that the Albanians «are playing the game of the Chinese-.

-You, Comrade Peng Chen,» railed Nikita Khrushchev, «made no mention of peaceful coexistence last evening, you did not speak about it at all. Did he, or did he not, Comrade Kapo?

«I represent the Party of Labour of Albania,» replied Hysni. «There you have Peng Chen, ask him!»

«We cannot agree at all with Mao Zedong and the Chinese, nor they with us. Do you want us to send you, Comrade Kapo, to reach agreement with them?» Khrushchev asked Comrade Hysni on another occasion.

«I do not take orders from you,N replied Hysni, «I take orders only from my Party.»

Nothing could make him budge from the courageous, revolutionary, principled stand of, the Party. He never flickered an eyelash at the screams and the pressure of the charlatan Nikita Khrushchev. Cool, calm and principled, Comrade Hysni Kapo declared in the name of the Party that the Party of Labour of Albania considered the discussion of these questions in the Bucharest Meeting to be out of order, just as it considered misplaced the eff orts which the Chinese made in the beginning to discuss these matters with the trade union delegations. «The PLA considers the open or disguised polemic in the press harmful,» he declared. «As to who is right, let us judge this in the forthcoming meeting of the parties.»

The Khrushchevites were alarmed that the plot was going to explode in their own hands.

Then the visits back and forth, the «advice», the «friendly consultations and talks» and the pressures disguised with jokes and smiles, began. Andropov, the man of backstage deals and intrigues (that is why they have made him chief of the KGB), was one of the most active and did everything in his power to compel our Party to take part in the plot.

The Soviets did not fail to involve their lackeys in the other parties in this dirty game. Andropov picked up a certain Moghioros and went to Hysni for a «visit». Andropov sat back implying, «I am not going to speak», and Moghioros prattled on and on about the «correctness of the Marxist-Leninist line of the Soviet party».

«What is Albania doing?» asked Zhivkov. .Only you do not agree.»

"What do you mean by that?» asked Hysni.

«Nothing, I was only joking,» said Zhivkov, changing his tune.

«Joking about what? You had something in mind when you said that 'Albania does not agree'.»

While the meeting was going on in Bucharest, here we met almost every day in the Political Bureau, maintained continual contact with Hysni Kapo, instructed him, and followed with attention and concern how events were developing. By now we had reached the unanimous conclusion:

The Bucharest Meeting is an organized plot against Marxism-Leninism; there Khrushchev and company are revealing their faces as rabid revisionists, therefore we are not going to make any concessions to the revisionists even if we remain alone against them all.

Our stand was correct and Marxist-Leninist. The black deed organized by Khrushchev had to be defeated.

It is a publicly known fact that our Party defended China at Bucharest with Marxist-Leninist courage and adherence to principles. We were well aware of the consequences of this stand. Today, so many years after the Bucharest plot, when unfortunately the Chinese party, too, is skidding irretrievably on the rails of betrayal, revisionism and counter-revolution, I want to stress once again, that the stand of our Party at Bucharest and Moscow was absolutely right and the only correct stand.

As I have written above, we had had reservations about certain views which had been expressed by Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders, we had reservations about the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of China, but after 1957 it seemed as if a positive change had been made in that party and their former opportunist mistakes had been put aside. Any party can make mistakes, but these can be corrected, and when this is done, the party is strengthened and the work progresses. In China there was no longer any talk about the 8th Congress, the rightist views of Peng Dehuai had been attacked, and the «one hundred flowers» had been dropped. In their official statements and in published articles the Chinese openly attacked Yugoslav revisionism, defended Stalin and maintained theoretically correct stands on war and peace, peaceful coexistence, the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This is not the place and time to analyse the motives which impelled the Chinese leaders, and to explain whether or not there was something principled in these stands of theirs at that period (I have written about these matters in my diary), but one thing was clear: at that period the Communist Party of China came out as a defender of Marxism-Leninism.

The Khrushchevites accused us of «breaking with the 200 millions to unite with the 600 millions». In defending China, we did not proceed from any financial, economic, military or demographic motive. If we had proceeded from these anti-Marxist pragmatic motives, then it would have been more «advantageous» for us to have lined up with the Khrushchevites, because the Soviet Union was more powerful and Khrushchev would not have hesitated to give us credits and «aid» immediately (of course, in order to demand the freedom and independence of our people, our Homeland and our Party in recompense later).

Hence, in Bucharest and Moscow, we did not defend China as a big country from which we might get aid, but we defended the Leninist norms and Marxism-Leninism. We did not defend the Communist Party of China because it was a big party, but we defended our principles, we defended Marxist-Leninist justice. At Bucharest and Moscow we would have defended any party or country, be it big or small numerically, provided only that it was with Marxism-Leninism. We proclaimed this loudly at that time, and time has fully confirmed it.

The struggle in defence of Marxism-Leninism against revisionism was the only basis which placed us in the one trench with the Communist Party of China.

These were the motives which impelled us to maintain the stands we did in Bucharest and later in Moscow. Our Party, tempered in struggles and battles, clear about and determined on its Marxist-Leninist course, said «stop» to the Khrushchevite attack, resisted this attack heroically and did not waver in the face of pressure and blackmail of every type.

Khrushchev could not forgive us for what we did to revisionism. But neither could we forgive him for what he had done against Marxism-Leninism, against the revolution, against the Soviet Union, against Albania and the international communist and workers' movement.

The open fight began. The Soviet Embassy in Tirana, through its KGB agents, intensified the pressure, interference and sabotage in the dirtiest forms. The Soviet militarymen and civilians working in Albania committed provocations against our people by attacking the leadership, alleging that we had taken wrong positions, that we att.acked the Soviet Union, that we did not keep our word, and other base things. The officials of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana. with ambassador Ivanov at the head, tried to recruit agents and provoked our officers by asking them, «Who is the army with?», and tried to work on certain elements to put them in opposition to the line of the Party.

This activity had two objectives: on the one hand, to incite our Party and people against the leadership, by hiding behind «all the good things» which the Soviet Union had allegedly done for Albania, and on the other hand, to seize the slightest opportunity to sow confusion by exploiting the sincere love which our Party and people nurtured for the Soviet Union.

At these difficult moments, the steel unity of the ranks of our Party, the loyalty of the members and cadres of the Party to the Central Committee of the Party and our Political Bureau, once again stood out brilliantly. In the Albanian communists, the provocations of the Soviet revisionists ran into an insurmountable barricade, an immovable rock. The only treacherous elements who opposed the monolithic unity of our ranks were Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko, who surrendered to the pressure of the Soviets and, in those moments of severe storms and tests, showed their true faces as capitulators, provocateurs and anti-Marxists. As events confirmed, both these elements had long placed themselves in Khrushchev's service, had become his agents and fought to attack our Party and its leadership from within. The Party and the people unmasked them and condemned them with hatred and contempt.

The provocations which the Soviet Embassy in Tirana organized ceaselessly were now co-ordinated with the external pressures which were exerted on our Party and country by the Soviet revisionist leadership and its allies. These were of many kinds : economic, political and military.

In their efforts to overcome the resistance of the PLA and the Albanian people, the Khrushchevites abandoned every scruple, going so far as to threaten our country with the blockade to starve us. These rabid enemies of socialism and of the Albanian peopie in particular, refused to supply us with grain at a time when our bread grain reserves would last us only 15 days. At that time we were obliged to use our hard currency to buy wheat in France. The French merchant who came to Tirana sounded us out to find what was the reason that impelled Albania to buy grain f rom the Western countries when it had the Soviet Union as its «great friend». Of course, we told the bourgeois merchant nothing. On the contrary, we told him that the Soviet Union had supplied us with grain, with maize, but we had «used it for the livestock».

«Why worry yourselves about bread grain,» Khrushchev had said to us. «Plant citrus-fruit. The mice in our granaries eat as much grain as Albania needs.» And when the Albanian people were in danger of being left without bread, Khrushchev preferred to feed the mice and not the Albanians. According to him, there were only two roads for us: either submit or die. This was the cynical logic of this traitor.

However, the great rift in our relations with the Soviet leadership could not be covered up for long, especially when the Khrushchevites themselves were revealing it more and more each day.

The Soviet and Bulgarian ambassadors in Yugoslavia applauded the hangman Rankovic during those days, when, at a rally in Sremska Mitrovica, he described Albania as xa hell enclosed with barbed wire», the Bulgarians published a map of the Balkans and xby mistake». included our country within the boundaries of Yugoslavia; in Warsaw, Gomulka's men forced their way into the embassy of the PR of Albania and attempted to kill the Albanian ambassador; Khrushchev tolerated and whetted the appetite of the Greek monarcho-fascists, like Venizelos, when they played the worthless card of the annexation of the so-called Northern Epirus, etc., etc. During those days, these and tens of such things occurred from all directions against our Party and country. The hand of Khrushchev, who strove at all costs to force us to yield and submit was apparent, directly or indirectly, in all these anti-Albanian activities.

However, our Party and people stood firm on the correct Marxist-Leninist line. We told the communists and cadres what was occurring in the communist and workers' movement, told them about the betrayal of the Khrushchevites, and the masses of the Party closed their ranks around the Central Committee to face the storm which was being raised by the Khrushchevites. They found no breaches in this block of steel and the banner of the Party waved and will always wave proud and unyielding in the teeth of any storm.

The Central Committee called on the Party and people to close their ranks, to safeguard and strengthen their unity and patriotism, to keep cool, to avoid falling for provocations, to be vigilant and fearless. We told the Party that this was the way to ensure the triumph of the correct Marxist-Leninist line which we were following. We told the Party that irrespective of the fact that the enemies were many and powerful, we would triumph.

With the provocations which were hatched up in Moscow or the other capitals of vassal countries, as well as through the Soviet Embassy in Tirana and its staff, the Khrushchevites were also pursuing another aim: they wanted to fabricate and gather false facts to have as weapons in connection with the accusation that we Albanians were allegedly ruining the relations and thus counterbalance our well-founded theoretical and political arguments. Moscow was terrified of this confrontation, especially if this were to take place at the meeting of the communist and workers' parties of the world. This would be a serious defeat for modern revisionism, headed by Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites; therefore they did not want matters to reach that point. At all costs they needed our submission, or at least, «reconciliation» with us.

To this end, during the time that the Soviet Embassy in Tirana was operating through provocations, Moscow, through Kozlov, wearied itself sending letter after letter to the «Central Committee and Comrade Enver Hoxha». In these letters they demanded that I should go to Moscow so that we could talk and reach agreement as «the friends and comrades we are». «We must eliminate that minor misunderstanding and disagreement which occurred at Bucharest.» «Neither side must allow a small spark to kindle a big conflagration» etc.

Their aim was clear: to compel our Party to keep quiet, to reconcile itself to them and become collaborator in the betrayal. They wanted to drag us to Moscow and to operate on us in the «workshops» of their Central Committee in order to «convince» us. However, we knew with whom we were dealing and our answer was curt: «Comrade Enver Hoxha cannot go to Moscow except for the meeting of the communist and workers' parties. We told you what we had to say in Bucharest; we shall state our views and our stand at the coming meeting of the parties.

The Khrushchevites were more than ever convinced that neither their flattery, their credits, their sickly smiles, nor their blackmail and threats would have any effect on the Party of Labour of Albania.

The other accomplices did not fail to participate in their efforts to persuade the PLA to give up its struggle against the revisionist betrayal. A series of parties of countries of the socialist camp sent us copies of the letters they had sent to the Communist Party of China. The Khrushchevites wanted to threaten us with these letters: «We are all in one flock, therefore consider matters well before you break away.»

Those who danced to Khrushchev's tune also received the reply they deserved from us. «In Bucharest it was you who were wrong and not we. Ours was a correct Marxist-Leninist stand. We did not associate ourselves with you and we will express our opinion in Moscow.»

These letters all arrived at the same time and without doubt this was something suggested and arranged by the Soviets. It was interesting that when they affirmed the alleged «complete unity of all communist and workers' parties» at the Bucharest Meeting, they did not define clearly on what problems this «unity» was displayed. Indeed in the letter from the Soviets, this expression did not exist(!). No doubt, the Soviets did not want to appear involved in this manoeuvre but had made a cat's paw of the others. However, the Party of Labour of Albania was not confused by these base and banal tactics. In our letter we gave them a clear-cut reply to these distortions of the truth and we made this reply known to all, so that all the parties which rushed to «bring the Party of Labour of Albania to its senses» would understand clearly that the PLA was not a party which comes to agreement with traitors.

The PLA did not maintain its stand out of spite or any chance caprice. No. The letter referred to, like all the other documents of this period, with their lofty adherence to principle, their sound Marxist-Leninist spirit and the profundity of their judgements and scientific arguments, were not only a blow at the attempts to set our Party on a wrong road, but also a contribution and aid which we gave the sister parties, including the Soviet party, on how the issues should be judged, where the truth lay and how it should be defended with courage and adherence to principles.

Now we were preparing for the Moscow Meeting where we foresaw that a fierce struggle would be waged. Our Party had decided that at the coming meeting of the parties it would openly attack the betrayal of the Khrushchevite revisionists who had put themselves in opposition to the Marxist-Leninist theory. We would fight against their traitorous practice and policy, would defend the Soviet Union, Leninism and Stalin, would attack the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and hit out at all the vile, anti-Albanian actions of the Khrushchevites and Khrushchev personally.

The battle began in the commission which was to prepare the draft-declaration for the meeting. There the Soviets had Suslov, Pospyelov, Kozlov, Ponomariov, Andropov, and some others. A «solid» delegation this, saturated with «big brains» to impress us. Apart from us and the Chinese, almost all the other delegations were made up of low-ranking, third or fourth-rate people. It was clear that everything had been co-ordinated and agreement had been reached, so that they had nothing further to discuss.

We understood clearly that the struggle in the commission was only the prologue to the Brama. We foresaw that the Soviets and their hangers-on would make concessions, insignificant ones, of course, and would struggle to ensure that the declaration that would emerge from the meeting should be «neither fish nor fowl,» with dubious f ormulations, with everything smoothed over, with some minor retreats and formulations about the «factions and groupings» in which they classified our Party too. Therefore, the Political Bureau advised our delegation comprised of Comrades Hysni Kapo and Ramiz Alia, to fight for a strongly-worded declaration.

That was not all. We also foresaw the other variant, that the Khrushchevites might accept a declaration with correct and accurate formulations, provided that the meeting itself would go smoothly, without struggle or exposure, without any lifting of the piecrust to reveal what lay inside. We foresaw this because we knew they feared debate like the devil fears holy water. They would be ready to make concessions when they felt themselves hard pressed and would say: «You don't like this?! Well, let us make it even stronger. Only there must be no fight. We shall make the declaration and sign it, without any condemnation of Bucharest, without principled struggle» and... what of it? Then, when everything is over, the spokesmen will come out: «Bucharest was poljezen* (useful (Russian in the original).) our line pravilna, *() the Chinese and the Albanians were condemned for dogmatism but were corrected,» while for them the declaration would be a worthless piece of paper just as it happened in fast.

This was not what we wanted. The declaration must not be a cover for the revisionists' corruption, but must be the result of the debate, struggle and exposure. In the correspondence which we kept up with our delegation in Moscow we cabled : «Our aim and task is not to collect declarations but to attack and expose the mistakes. We are not short of declarations.»

A stern struggle was waged in the preparatory commission. Suslov directed the whole thing in order to have the revisionist theses of the 20th Congress and approval of the line followed by the Soviet leadership included in the draft-declaration. Our comrades fought hard, exposed these views, and insisted that the formulation in the draft must be precise, Marxist Leninist, and in unequivocal terms. «No unclarity, no inferred meaning or expression which can be interpreted at will tomorrow can be permitted,» declared the representatives of our Party, Comrades Hysni and Ramiz.

They attacked the theses of the Khrushchevites about the taming of imperialism and told them bluntly that «the tendency to prettify imperialism, which has been observed, is dangerous», and defended Stalin's thesis that peace can be achieved only when the peoples take this question into their own hands. «To say that it is possible to build a world without wars today (Khrushchev's thesis) when imperialism exists,» stressed Comrade Hysni Kapo, «is contrary to the teachings of Lenin.»

Contrary to the desires of the Khrushchevites, our delegation in the commission insisted that the draft-declaration stress that «revisionism is the main danger in the communist movement» and that Yugoslav revisionism should be mentioned specifically as an imperialist agency. Our comrades pointed out emphatically the danger of the thesis that «revisionism has been defeated ideologically» which Khrushchev and company wanted to impose on all the other parties. «Not only does revisionism exist but its horns are growing today,» said Comrade Hysni Kapo.

The representatives of our Party were faced with virtually a united front of revisionists. The Khrushchevite puppets, directed by Suslov and others, attacked them in order to force them to abandon the correct line which they defended. But Hysni Kapo told them, «Our Party will never agree to speak according to the wishes of this or that person, or as a result of pressures exerted on it.» He routed the accusations and provocations of Khrushchev's lackeys and once again condemned the plot in Bucharest and the efforts to carry it out in Moscow.

When Suslov, this revisionist devoid of any scruple, dared to throw mud at our Party and likened its views to those of the counter-revolutionary Kerensky, Comrade Hysni slapped right back in his face:

«You have got the wrong address, Comrade Suslov, in talking to me about Kerensky. I want to declare that the Party of Labour of Albania was not formed by Kerensky. Kerensky is yours. We have recognized and still recognize Lenin and the Party of Lenin. Our Party, founded by Enver Hoxha on the basis of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, is fighting to defend MarxismLeninism loyally and it will continue to do so.» In conclusion he added:

«Those who were the supporters of the counter-revolutionary traitor, Imre Nagy, cannot accuse the Party of Labour of Albania of being a bourgeois party or the Albanian communists of being Kerenskys.»

«There's a misunderstanding here!» said Suslov trying to somewhat soften the crushing effect of the reply he received:

«Everything is clear to us, although perhaps not to you,» replied Comrade Hysni.

Confronted with incontestable arguments, the Soviets were obliged to retreat during the sessions, but the next day the fight began afresh over matters which had been decided, because Khrushchev had tweaked the ears of Suslov and company,

The Syrian, Baghdash, a very docile lackey of Khrushchev's, got up and made the accusation that our Party, in criticizing the Soviet leadership, was allegedly wanting a vnew communism». Hysni Kapo made ready to reply to this base accusation from Baghdash. In a second speech which Hysni wanted to deliver in the meeting of the commission, amongst other things he stressed:

«Our Party sent us here to express its views».

It has not intended and does not intend to formulate any new text-book of Marxism-Leninism, nor is it seeking any other communist movement, as Comrade Baghdash has suggested. Our Party has fought and is fighting courageously for the communism of rMarx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and, because it has done this, it is in power and is successfully building socialism. You, Comrade Baghdash, have apparently made a mistake in the address. Please direct your criticisms about the 'new communism' to those who claim such a thing, the revisionists, and not to us.»

Despite the persistence of Comrade Hysni, however, the presidium of the meeting of the commission, manipulated by the Khrushchevites, did not allow him to read his second speech, the text of which is kept in the archives of our Party.

As usual, besides the attacks and accusations, there was no shortage of expressions of hypocritical Hfriendship» towards our comrades. One day Kozlov invited Comrade Hysni to lunch, but he thanked him and declined to go.

The struggle of the delegates of the Party of Labour of Albania, the representatives of the Communist Party of China and of some other party, brought about that many of the revisionist theses were left out and Marxist-Leninist formulations were made on many questions. However, there were still unresolved issues, and about these Kozlov wanted to bring out «internal communiqués». Afraid that they were losing the battle, the Khrushchevites were striving to save what they could. This was only the prologue to the fight. The real battle was stili ahead of us.

We knew that it would be difficult, stern, and that we would be in the minority. But this did not frighten us. We prepared ourselves carefully for the meeting so that the judgements and analyses of our Party were mature and well-considered, courageous and principled. We discussed the speech which I was to deliver to the Moscow Meeting at a special meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party, which endorsed it unanimously, because it was an analysis which the Party of Labour of Albania made of the problems of our doctrine and the anti-Marxist activity of the Khrushchevites. In Moscow we were to expound the unwavering line of our Party, and display the ideological and political maturity and the rare revolutionary courage which has characterized our Party throughout its whole heroic existence.

The documents of the Party deal at length with the proceedings of the Meeting of 81 parties, with the speeches and contributions of our delegation at those decisive and historic moments through which the communist world, and especially our country and Party, were passing, therefore it is not necessary to elaborate on these things.

Mehmet, Hysni, Ramiz and I, as well as a number of comrades assisting the delegation, set out for Moscow to take part in the Meeting of 81 communist and workers' parties. We were convinced that we were going to a country in which the enemies had seized power and where we would have to be very careful because they would behave like enemies and would record every word and every step of ours. We had to be vigilant and prudent. We were convinced, too, that they would try to break the code of our radiograms in order to discover our aims and our slightest tactic.

In passing through Budapest we were met by several of the main «comrades» of the Hungarian party, who behaved correctly with us. Neither they nor we made any allusion to the problems. We boarded the train for the Ukraine. The staff of the train looked at us coldly and served us without speaking at all, while men who were certainly security officers, patrolled the corridors. We had not the least desire to open the slightest conversation with them because we knew who they were and what they represented.

At the Kiev station, two or three members of the Central Committee of the Ukraine had come to meet us. They gave us a cool reception, and we remained as cold as ice, even refusing to drink their coffee. Then we boarded the train and continued the journey to Moscow where Kozlov, Yefremov, member of the Central Committee, and the deputy chief of protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had come out to meet us. At the Moscow station they had also brought out a guard of honour, a band played anthems and soldiers paraded with martial step, just to keep up the custom as for all the delegations. No young pioneers came out to welcome us with flowers. Kozlov offered us his cold hand, accompanied with an artificial smile from ear to ear, and in his deep voice bid us welcome. But the ice remained ice.

As soon as the anthems and the parade were over we heard cheering, clapping and enthusiastic calls, «Long live the Party of Labour!» We saw that they came from several hundred Albanian students who were studying in Moscow. They were not permitted to enter the station, but finally they were allowed in to avoid causing a scandal. Paying no attention to Kozlov and Yefremov, who never left us, we greeted our students who were shouting with joy, and together with them, we cheered for our Party. This was a good lesson for the Soviets to see what sort of unity our Party and people have with their leadership. The students did not leave us until we climbed into ZIL cars. In the car Kozlov was unable to find anything to say except «Your students are unruly.»

«No,» I said, «they are great patriots and love the Party and their leadership whole-heartedly.»

Kozlov and Yef remov accompanied us to the residence which they had allocated to us at Zarechie, some 20-25 km outside Moscow. This was the villa where I had stayed many times with the comrades and with Nexhmije when I came on holiday. They told me once, «We have reserved this villa for Zhou Enlai and you, we put no one else here.» Even in the villa they had united us with the Chinese. As we proved later with the special detector we had brought with us, they had filled the villa with bugging devices.

I knew Kozlov well because I had talked with him many a time before. He was one of those who speak a great deal but say nothing. Quite apart from what we thought of them now, right from the first meeting I had gained the impression that this Kozlov had no brains. He pretended to know things, assumed poses, but his «pumpkin» had no seeds. He did not drink like the others and it must be said he was considered the second man in the leadership after Khrushchev.

I have written above about the quarrel I had with Kozlov and Pospyelov in 1957, in the «Kirov» Academic Opera and Ballet Theatre in Leningrad, over the speech I had made at the «Lenin- machine-building plant.

I remember that that night, when we returned from the theatre, the three of us were in one ZIL. I was in the middle. Kozlov said to Pospyelov, using the affectionate diminutive name, as is the Russian custom:

«You are a great man, one of the greatest theoreticians we have.»

«Nu njet, nu njet,»* *( Not me, not me. (R.ussian in the original).) replied Pospyelov «modestly».

I couldn't understand the reason for all this flattery, but later we learned that this Pospyelov was one of those who formulated the secret report against Stalin. Kozlov continued:

«What I say is right, but you are modest, very modest.»

This conversation continued the whole way, with one flattering the other until we arrived at our residence. This was sickening to me because it is not our way at all.

I was less acquainted with Yefremov.

One Sunday when I was in Moscow with Mehmet at the time of the 21st Congress, Polyansky, then a member of the Presidium of the Soviet party and now ambassador in Tokyo, invited us to lunch at his dacha outside Moscow. We went. Everything was covered in white because snow had fallen. It was cold. The villa, too, was white as snow, beautiful. Polyansky told us:

«This is the dacha where Lenin used to rest.»

With this he wanted to tell us, «I am an important person.» Here we found Yefremov and another secretary, from the Crimea, if I am not mistaken. They introduced us to him. It was ten o’clock in the morning. The table was laden as in the fables about the Russian czars.

«Let us sit down and have breakfast,» said Polyansky.

«We have eaten already,» we said.

«No, no,» he said, «we shall sit down and eat again.» (Of course he meant «drink.)

We did laot drink but we watched them drinking and talking. What colossal amounts they ate and drank ! ! We opened our eyes wide as they downed whole tumblers of vodka and various wines. Polyansky, with his intriguer's face, was boasting without the least shame, while Yefremov with the other secretary, and another person who came in later, drank and without the slightest sign of embarrassment from our presence, poured out their sickening praises on Polyansky. «There is no one like you, you are a great man, the pillar of the party, you are the Khan of the Crimea,» etc., etc. The «breakfast» went on in this way until one o'clock. Mehmet and I were bored to death. We did not know what to do. I thought of billiards and in order to get away from this roomful of boozers I asked Polyansky:

«Is there a billiard table in the house?

«Yes, of course,» he replied. «Do you want us to come?»

«With great pleasure!» I said, and we got up at once.

We went up to the billiard room. We siayed there an hour and a half or two hours. The vodka, pertsofka* *( peppered vodka and hors-d'oeuvres (Russian in the original).) and zakuski* *( peppered vodka and hors-d'oeuvres (Russian in the original).) were sent up to them in the billiard room. Then we asked permission to ieave.

«Where are you going?» asked Polyansky.

«To Moscow,» we replied.

«Impossible,» he said, «we are just about to have lunch.»

We opened our eyes in amazement. Mehmet said to him

«But what have we been doing up till now? H aven't we eaten enough for two days?»

«Oh, no,» said Yefremov, «what we ate was just a light breakfast, while now the real lunch begins.»

They took us by the arm and led us back to the dining room. What a sight met our eyes! The table had been loaded all over again. The Soviet state of proletarians paid for all this food and drink for its leaders so they could «rest» and enjoy themselves! We told them: «We cannot eat any more.» We declined, but they wouldn't hear of it and begged us to eat and drink without a break. Mehmet had a good idea when he asked:

HHave you got a cinema here? Could we see a film?»

«We have, indeed,» said Polyansky and rang the bell, ordering the projectionist to prepare to show a film.

After half an hour everything was ready. We went to the cinema and sat down. I remember it was a Mexican colour film. We had escaped from the stolovaya*. *( dining room (Russian in the original).) The film had not been running for more than ten minutes, when, in the darkness, we saw Polyansky and the others stealing quietly out of the room back to the vodka. When the film was over we found them sitting there drinking.

«Come along,» they said, «now we shall eat something, «because it tastes fine after the film.»

«No,» we said, «we can eat and drink no more. Please allow us to return to Moscow.»

Very reluctantly they allowed us to get up.

«You will have to sample the beautiful Russian winter's night,» they told us.

«Let us sample even the winter,» I said to Mehmet in Albanian, «but let us get away from this drinking den and these boozers.»

We put on our overcoats and went out in the snow. We took only a few steps and a ZIM drew up: two other friends of Polyansky, one, a certain Popov, whom I had known in Leningrad because there he had been factotum to Kozlov. who had boosted him to minister of culture of the Russian Republic. We embraced in the snow.

«Please come back,» they said, «just for another hour...,» etc., etc.





We refused and left. However, I paid a price for this. I took a chill, developed a heavy cold with a temperature and was absent from sessions of the congress. (I related this to open up a corner of the life of the Soviet leaders, those who undermined the Soviet regime and the authority of Stalin.)

Now let us come back again to our arrival in Moscow before the meeting of the parties.

Kozlov, then, accompanied us to the villa. On other occasions, usually they took us to the house and left. But this time Kozlov wanted to show that he was a friendly comrade». He took off his coat and went straight into the stolovaya, which was full of bottles, snacks and black caviar.

«Come along, let us have something to eat and drink,» said Kozlov, but this was not what he was really concerned about. He wanted to talk with us to learn with what opinions and predispositions we had come.

He began the conversation by saying:

«Now the commission has finished the draft and we are virtually all in agreement. The Chinese comrades are in agreement, too. There are four or five matters on which a common opinion has not been reached, but we can bring out an internal communiqué about them.»

Turning to Hysni for his approval he asked, «Isn't that so?»

Hysni replied:

«No, it is not so. The work is not finished.

We have objections and reservations which our Party has presented in the written statement we forwarded to the commission.»

Kozlov frowned, he did not get the approval he wanted. I intervened and said to Kozlov:

«This will be a serious meeting in whióh all the problems must be put forward correctly. Many questions have been put forward in a distorted way, not just in the draft, but especially in life, in theory and practice. Everything must be reflected in the declaration. We shall not accept internal notes and addenda. Nothing in obscurity, everything in the light. That is why the meeting is being held.»

«It doesn't need a great deal of talk,» said Kozlov.

Mehmet jumped up and said in a derisive tone:

«Even in the UNO we speak as long as we like. Castro spoke there for four hours, while you apparently think you can restrict us!»

Hysni said

«You interrupted our speech twice in the commission and did not allow us to continue to speak.»

«These things should not occur,» I added. «You ought to know that we do not accept such methods.»

«We must preserve unity, otherwise it is tragic,» said Koalov.

«Unity is safeguarded by speaking openly, in conformity with the Marxist-Leninist line and norms,» replied Mehmet.

Kozlov got his reply, proposed a toast to me, helped himself to something to est and left.

The whole period until the meeting of the parties began was filled with attacks and counterattacks between us and revisionists of all ranks. The revisionists had opened war on us on a broad scale and we replied to their attacks blow for blow.

Their tactic was to do everything in their power to prevent us f rom speaking out at the meeting and openly putting forward our criticisms about the crimes they had committed. Certain that we would not budge from our correa opinions and decisions, they resorted to slander, alleging that the things we would raise were unfounded, would cause «division», that we were making «tragic» mistakes, that we were «at fault» and should change our course, etc., etc. The Soviets made great efforts to brainwash all the delegations of sister communist and workers' parties which were to take part in the meeting, in this direction. For their own part, they posed as «infallible», «blameless», «principled», and as though they held thefate of the Marxist-Leninist truth in their hands.

The pressure and provocations were exerted against us openly. In the reception put on in the Kremlin on the occasion of November 7, Kosygin.

approached me, his face as pale as wax, and began to give me a sermon* *( French in the original.

) about friendship.

«We shall safeguard and defend our friendship with the Soviet Union on the Marxist-Leninist road,». I told him.

«There are enemies in your party who are fighting this friendship,» said Kosygin.

«Ask him,» I said to Mehmet, who knew Russian well, «can he tell us who are these enemies in our Party?»

Kosygin found himself in a tight spot. He began to mumble and said:

«You did not understand me well.»

«Enough of that,» said Mehmet, «we understood you very well, but you lack the courage to speak openly. We shall tell you openly in the meeting what we think about you.»

We walked away from that revisionist mummy.

(During the whole evening the Soviets acted towards us is such a way as not to leave us alone in peace, but isolated us from one another and surrounded us, according to previously prepared stage directions.)

A little later the Marshals Chuikov, Zakharov, Konev, and others, surrounded Mehmet and me. As instructed, they sang another tune: «You Albanians are fighters, you fought well, you resisted properly until you triumphed over Hitlerite Germany,» and Zakharov continued to cast stones at the German people. At that moment Shelepin joined us. He began to oppose Zakharov over what he said about the Germans. Zakharov got angry and disregarding the fact that Shelepin was a member of the Presidium and chief of the KGB, told him: «Go away, why do you butt into our conversation? You want to teach me what the Germans are? When I was fighting them, you were still drinking your mother's milk,» etc.

In the midst of this talk of the haughty marshals, full of vodka, Zakharov, who , had been director of the «Voroshilov» Military Academy, where Mehmet and other comrades were sent to learn the Stalinist military art, said to Mehmet: «When you were here you were an outstanding student of our military art.» Mehmet cut short his words and said : «Thank you for the compliment, but do you want to say th at this evening too, here in Georgievsky Zal, we are superior and subordinate, commander and pupil?»

Marshal Chuikov, who was no less drunk, intervened and said: «We want to say that the Albanian army should always stand with us...» Mehmet replied there and then, «Our army is and will remain loyal to its own people and will loyally defend the construction of socialism on the Marxist-Leninist road; it is and will remain solely under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, as a weapon of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Albania. Do you stili not understand this, Marshal Chuikov? So much the worse for you!»

The marshals got their reply. One of them, I don't remember, whether Konev or some other, seeing that the talk was getting out of hand, intervened: «Let us end this talk. Come and drink a glass to the friendship between our two peoples and our two armies.»

Along with this feverish anti-Albanian and anti Marxist activity, Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites attacked us openly in the material which they sent to the Chinese, in which they also attacked them. They distributed this material to ali delegations, including ours. As is known, in

this material, Albania no longer figured as a socialistcountry as far as the Khrushchevites were concerned. Apart from this, during a talk with Liu Shaoqi, Khrushchev had said: «We lost Albania, but we did not lose much; you won it, but you did not win much, either. The Party of Labour has always been a weak link in the international communist movement.»

The Khrushchevites' tactic was clear to us. The intention was, first, to threaten us by saying: « It depends on us whether you are or are not a socialist country, and hence, in the document which we hand you, Albania is no longer a socialist country,» and second, to threaten the others that, «The Party of Labour of Albania is not a Marxist-Leninist party, and whoever defends it as such will be wrong and will be condemned together with the Party of Labour of Albania.» This meant in other words: «You communist and workers' parties that are coming to the meeting should be clear already that the things Enver Hoxha is going to say at the meeting are slanders, are the words of an antiSoviet element.»

At the meeting, it was quite clear how they had groomed Ibarruri, Gomulka, Dej, etc., well in advance.

A few days before I spoke at the meeting, Khrushchev sought a meeting with me, of course, to «convince» us to change our stand. We decided to go to this meeting in order to make it quite clear to the Khrushchevites once again that we would not budge from our positions. Meanwhile, however, we read the material of which I spoke above. I met Andropov, who during those days was running back and forth as Khrushchev's courier.

«Today I read the material in which Albania does not figure as a socialist country,» I told him.

Without a blush, Andropov, who had been one of the authors of that base document, asked me, «What connection does this letter have with Albania?»

«This letter makes my meeting with Khrushchev impossible,» I replied.

Andropov frowned and murmured:

«That is a very serious statement, Comrade Enver. »

«Yes,» I said, «very serious! Tell Khrushchev it is not he who decides whether Albania is or is not a socialist country. The Albanian people and their Marxist-Leninist Party have decided this with their blood.»

Once again Andropov repeated like a parrot:

«But that is a material about China and has nothing to do with Albania, Comrade Enver.»

«We shall express our opinion in the meeting of the parties. Good-bye!» and I ended the conversation.

The written indictment of China which was distributed was a dirty anti-Marxist document. With this the Khrushchevites had decided to continue in Moscow what they had not achieved in Bucharest. Once again they used a cunning, Trotskyite tactic. They distributed this voluminous material against China before the meeting, in order to prepare the terrain and to brainwash the delegations of other parties, and to intimidate the Chinese, to compel them to take a moderate stand, if they would not submit. This anti-Chinese material did not surprise us, but it strengthened the conviction we had in the correctness of the line and the Marxist-Leninist stands of our Party in defence of the Communist Party of China. The material cast a deep gloom over the participants in the meeting and would not be welcomed as the Khrushchevites expected. Splits would be created in the meeting and this was in favour of MarxismLeninism. We could count on 7 to 10 parties which would adhere more to our side, if not openly, at least by not approving the hostile undertaking of the Khrushchevites.

As it turned out, the Chinese delegation had come to the Moscow Meeting with the idea that the tempers could be cooled, and initially they had prepared a material in a conciliatory tone, tolerant towards the stands and actions of the Khrushchevites. Den Xiaoping was to deliver it. As was becoming obvious, they had prepared a stand of «two or three variants». This seemed astonishing to us after those savage attacks which had been made on the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong in Bucharest. However, when the Khrushchevites launched even more vicious attacks, like those which were contained in the material they distributed before the meeting, then the Chinese were obliged to completely alter the material they had prepared, to put aside the conciliatory spirit and to take a stand in reply to Khrushchev's attacks.

There was a tense atmosphere when the meeting opened. Not without a purpose, they had put us near the speaker's rostrum so that we would be under the reproving finger of the anti-Marxist. Khrushchevite «prosecutors». But, contrary to their desires, we became the prosecutors and accusers of the renegades and the traitors. They were in the dock. We held our heads high because we were with Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev held his head in his two hands, when the bombs of our Party burst upon him.

Khrushchev's tactic at the meeting was cunning. He rose and spoke first, delivered an allegedly moderate, placatory speech, without open attacks, with phrases put together to set the tone for the meeting and create the impression that it ought to be calm, that we should not attack one another (they made their attacks in advance), that we should preserve unity (social-democratic), etc. With this he wanted to say: «We doni want quarrels, we doni want splits, nothing has happened, everything is going well.»

In his speech Khrushchev expressed the revisionist views completely and attacked the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania, as well as those who were going to follow these parties, but without mentioning any names. With this tactic in his speech he wanted to warn us: «Take your pick, either general attacks without any names, but with everybody understanding for whom they are intended, or if you don't like it that way, we shall attack you openly.» In fact, of the 20 puppet delegates who spoke, only 5 or 6 attacked China, basing themselves on the Soviet material.

Khrushchev and his puppets knew that we were going to declare war on Khrushchevite and world modern revisionism, and that is why they insisted, both in the commission and in their speeches, that the question of factions and groupings in the international communist movement as well as the assessments of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and several other points, which we opposed, should be included in the draft. It was clear that Khrushchev, who had abandoned Leninism and the Leninist norms, and who, as he himself claimed, had the «heritage and the monopoly of Leninism», wanted to keep all the communist and workers' parties of the world under his conductor's baton, under his dictate. Whoever came out against his line, defined at the 20th and 21st Congresses, was a factionist, an anti-Marxist involved in groupings. Obviously this is how he prepared the stick for the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labour of Albania, and tried to take the measures to expel us from the international communist movement, which he intended to subject to his anti-Marxist ideas.

After him, 15 or 20 others, carefully brainwashed and prepared, got up one after the other and spoke on Khrushchev's line: «Nothing has occurred, there is no problem amongst us, peace reigns, everything is going well.» What a disgraceful bluff by the Khrushchevites, who manipulated these hired lackeys in order to pose before us as men of principle ! This was the general tone. «They had synchronized their watches,» as Zhivkov had said in one of his speeches, and which Khrushchev cited in Bucharest as an «historic» saying.

While the meeting continued, the Soviets and Khrushchev were terrified of our speech and wanted at ali costs to convince us, if not to abandon our ideas, at least to soften our stand. They sent Thorez to mediate when they saw that we refused the meeting with Khrushchev. Thorez invited us to dinner, gave us a lecture about unityw and advised us to be «cool and restrained». Maurice Thorez certainly knew the issues, because we had discussed them together, but it was clear that now he was acting as Khrushchev's envoy. But he strove in vain.We refused every proposal and he threatened us:

«The meeting will attack you.»

KWe fear no one because we are on the right path,» we replied.

When they saw that they had failed with Thorez, the Soviets persisted with requests that we should meet Mikoyan, Kozlov, Suslov, Pospyelov and Andropov. We accepted. At this meeting in the villa in Zarechie, the Soviets presented matters as if nothing had occurred, as if they were not to be blamed at ali, but on the contrary, according to them, the blame lay on the Party of Labour of Albania ! Allegedly it was we who were worsening the relations with the Soviet Union and, they asked us to tell them openly why we were doing this!

We rejected these accusations and claims and demonstrated to them with incontestable facts that it was not we, but they, with their stands and actions, who had exacerbated the relations between our parties and countries.

For their part, Khrushchev's men, with utter shamelessness, denied everything, including their ambassador in Tirana, whom they called «durak»*, *( fool (Russian in the original).) when they attempted to lay the blame for their faults on him. They wanted to get on good terms with us at all costs so that we would shut our mouths. They even offered us credits and tractors. But after exposing them, we told them, «If you do not admit and correct your grave errors, all your efforts are in vain.» The following day Kozlov and Mikoyan came back again but they achieved nothing.

The time for our speech was approaching and they made their final effort - they asked that we meet Khrushchev in the Kremlin. Apparently Khrushchev was stili kidding himself that he could convince us», and we accepted the invitation, but not at the hour he set, in order to teli him that «not you, but we decide even the hour of the meeting» let alone other things. Apart from this, before we met him we wanted to send him an Horal message». We checked the residence they had allocated us with our detector and found that they had bugged us with microphones in every part of it. The only room unbugged was a toilet. When it was cold and we could not talk outside we were obliged to talk in the toilet. The Soviets were intrigued to learn where we talked and, when the idea struck them, they sent someone to put some microphones in the toilet, too. One of our officers caught the Soviet technician when he was carrying out the «operation», allegedly to repair a defect in the toilet, but our man told him:

«There's no need because the toilet functions well.»

Our embassy, also, was filled with bugging devices and, knowing this, after we set the time of the meeting, we left the Kremlin and went to the embassy. We set up our apparatus and it signalled that they were bugging us from every direction. Then Mehmet sent Khrushchev and the others «a message» lasting ten to fifteen minutes, describing them as «traitors», saying «you're eavesdropping on us-, etc., etc. Thus, when we went to the Kremlin, the revisionists had received our «greeting».

The meeting was held in Khrushchev's office and he began as usual:

«You have the floor. We are listening.»

«You requested the meeting,» I said, «you speak first.»

Khrushchev had to accept. Right f rom the start we were convinced that, in fact, he had come with the hope that, if he could not avoid, at least, he could soften the criticism that we were going to make at the meeting. Then, even if this meeting did not yield any result, he would use it, as usual, as an «argument» for the representatives of other parties to tell them, «See, we offered our hand to the Albanians once again, but they persisted in their course.»

Khrushchev and the others tried to cast the blame on our Party and feigned astonishment when we related historically how the differences between our parties had arisen.

«I am unaware that I had any conflict with Comrade Kapo in Bucharest,» said Khrushchev without a blush.

«The Central Committee of our Party was not and is not in agreement with Bucharest,- I told him.

«That is .of no importance, but the fact is that even before Bucharest you were not in agreement with us and you did not teli us this.»

Of course, the charlatan was lying and lying deliberately. Was it not this same Khrushchev who, in April 1957, wanted to arrogantly break off the talks, and even earlier in 1955 and 1956, had we not told Khrushchev and Suslov of our opposition over Tito, Nagy, Kadar ,and Gomulka?

Mehmet mentioned some of these facts to them and Mikoyan was obliged to mutter agreement.

But when he saw that he had his back to the wall, Khrushchev hopped from branch to branch, from one theme to the other, and it was impossible to discuss with him the major issues of principle which were in essence the source of the differences. Of course, he was not interested in touching on these things. He wanted the submission of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian people, he was their enemy.

«You are not in favour of putting our relations in order,» said Khrushchev.

«We want to put them in order, but first you must acknowledge your mistakes,N we told him.

The talk with us irritated Khrushchev. Of course, he was not used to having a small party and a small country resolutely oppose his stands and actions. Such was the chauvinist logic of overlords of these anti-Marxists, who, just like the imperialist bourgeoisie, considered the small peoples and countries vassals, and their rights commodities to be traded. When we told him openly of his mistakes and those of his men he jumped up:

«You are spitting on me,» he screamed. «It is impossible to talk to you. Only Macmillan has tried to speak to me like this.»

«Comrade Enver is not Macmillan, so take back your words,» both Mehmet and Hysni snapped back at him.

«Where shall I put them?

«Stick them in your pocket,» Mehmet said.

The four of us got up and left without shaking hands with them, without falling into their traps, concocted with threats and hypocritical promises.

As we were leaving the meeting room, Mehmet went back and said to Khrushchev: «The stone which you are throwing against our Party and people will fall on your own head. Time will show this!» and he closed the door and joined us.

This was our final talk with these renegades, who still sought to pose as Marxists. However, the struggle of our Party and the genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and their own counter-revolutionary actions would tear the demagogical disguise from them more and more each day.

Thus, these pressures had no result. We did not give way a fraction in our stand and neither did we tone down or change anything in our speech.

I am not going to dwell on the content of the speech which I delivered on behalf of our Central Committee in Moscow, because it has been published and the views of our Party on the problems which we raised are already known world-wide. I merely want to underline the way in which Khrushchev's followers reacted when they heard our attacks on their boss. Gomulka, Dej, Ibarruri, Ali Yata, Baghdash and many others mounted the tribune and competed in their zeal to take revenge on those who had «raised their hand against the mother party». It was both tragic and ludicrous to see these people, who posed as politicians and leaders «with a load C f brains», acting in this way as mercenaries, as hommes de paille*, *( men of straw (French in the original).) as puppets manipulated by the strings behind the scene.

In a break between sessions Todor Zhivkov approached me. His lips and chin were trembling.

«Can we have a discussion, brat*?» *( brother (Russian in the original).) he asked me.

«With whom are we to talk,» I replied. «I said what I had to say and you heard me, I believe. Who has sent you to talk, Khrushchev? I've nothing to discuss with you, go up on the tribune and speak.»

He went waxy pale and said

«I certainly shall get up and give you your answer.»

When we were coming out of the Georgievsky Zal to go to our residence, Anton Yugov, at the head of the stairs, said to us in a shocked tone:

«Where's this road leading you bratya?»* *( brothers (Russian in the original).)

«Where's Khrushchev's road leading you, because we are on and always will proceed on Lenin's road,» we told him. He dropped his head and we parted without shaking hands.

After I delivered the speech, Mehmet and I left the residence in which the Soviets had put us and went to the embassy, where we stayed for the rest of the time we were in Moscow. When we left their residence a Soviet security officer told Comrade Hysni in confidence, «Comrade Enver did well to go, because his life was in great danger here.» The Khrushchevites were capable of anything and we took our own measures. We sent the comrades of the embassy and the collaborators of our delegation out to the shops to buy food supplies. When the time we decided to leave came, we did not agree to go by aircraft, because an «accident» could happen more easily. Hysni and Ramiz stayed on in Moscow, as they had to sign the declaration, while Mehmet and I left the Soviet Union by train and ate nothing that came from their hands. We arrived in Austria, went down by train through Italy and from Bari returned safe and sound to Tirana on our own aircraft and went directly to the reception organized on the occasion of the 28th and 29th of November. We felt a great joy because we had carried out the task with which the Party charged us successfully, with Marxist-Leninist determination. The guests, too, wartime comrades, workers, officers, cooperativists, men and women, old and young were unrestrained in their enthusiasm and united firmly as a fist, as always, and all the more indifficult days.

Khrushchev and all those who followed him tried hard to ensure that the endorsed document of an international character would include the whole line of the Khrushchevite revisionists, which distorted the fundamental theses of Marxism-Leninism on the nature of imperialism, the revolution, peaceful coexistence, and so on. However, in the commissions, the delegations of our Party and the Communist Party of China strongly objected to and exposed these distortions. We managed to get many things corrected, many theses of the revisionists were rejected and many others were put correctly, until the final document emerged and was accepted by all the participants in the meeting.

The Khrushchevites were obliged to accept that document, but Khrushchev had declared beforehand: «The document is a compromise and compromises don't last long.» It was clear that Khrushchev himself would violate the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting and would accuse us as though it were we who were violating the directives and decisions of that Meeting.

After the Moscow Meeting our relations with the Soviet Union and the revisionists of Moscow grew continually worse until they, unilaterally, broke off these relations entirely.

On November 25, in the final meeting which Mehmet and Hysni had in Moscow with Mikoyan, Kosygin and Kozlov, the latter made open threats. Mikoyan said to them: «You cannot live a day without economic aid from us and the other countries of the socialist camp.» «We shall tighten our belts and eat grass, » Mehmet and Hysni told them, «but will not submit to you. You cannot conquer us.» The revisionists thought that the sincere love of our Party and people for the Soviet Union would play a role in favour of the revisionists of Moscow. They hoped that our many cadres who had been trained in the Soviet Union would return united as a block to split the Party from the leadership. Mikoyan expressed this, saying: «When the Party of Labour hears of your stand it will rise against you.» «Come and attend some meeting of our Party when we raise these problems,» Mehmet told him, «and you will see what sort of unity exists in our Party and around its leadership.»

These threats of the revisionists were not just words. They acted. The economic sabotage from Moscow and their experts mounted to a crescendo.





13. THE FINAL ACT

Steel unity in the Party and our people. The Soviets want to occupy the Vlora base. Tense situation at the base. Admiral Kasatonov goes off with his tail between his legs. The enemies dream of changes in our leadership. The 4th Congress of the PLA. Pospyelov and Andropov in Tirana. The Greek and Czechoslovak delegates get the answer that they deserve to their provocations. Khrushchev's envoys to Tirana fail in their mission. Why do they «invite» us to go to Moscow again?! Khrushchev's public attack on the PLA at the 22nd Congréss of the CPSU. The. final breach: in December 1961 Khrushchev cuts off diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Albania.

The whole Party and the people were informed of the events and the situation created especially after the Moscow Meeting. We knew that the attacks, provocations and blackmail would be increased and intensified as never before, we were convinced that Khrushchev's anger would be poured upon us, our Party and people, to force us to submit. We spoke to the Party and people with open hearts, explained everything that had occurred, and made the dangerous activity of the Khrushchevite revisionists clear to them. As always, the Party and the people displayed their high level of maturity, their brilliant revolutionary patriotism, their love for and loyalty to the Central Committee of the Party, and the correct line we had always followed. They thoroughly understood the difficult situation we were going through, therefore they strained all their mental and physical energies to the maximum, mobilized themselves totally, further tempered their unity, and the Soviet revisionists f ound themselves up against a concrete wall. The year 1961 was turned into a year of glorious tests. Everywhere, in every .sector, the provocations, insinuations and sabotage of the Khrushchevites were fearlessly and resolutely repelled. Nothing was allowed to pass. Moscow, followed immediately by the capitals of its satellites, began economic pressure on us. As the first serious pressure, the revisionista suspended action on the signed contracts and agreements of every kind, and later tore them up in Hitlerite style. They began to withdraw their experts, thinking that everything in our country would come to a standstill. But they were gravely mistaken.

The question of the Vlora base was the pretext for a quarrel. There was no doubt that the base was ours. We would never allow even an inch of our territory to be under the control of foreigners. By clear. official agreement signed by the two governments, without leaving the slightest ground for equivocation, the Vlora base belonged to Albania and, at the same time, was to serve the defence of the camp. It was stated in the agreement that the Soviet Union would provide twelve submarines and a number of auxiliary ships. We were to train the cadres and we trained them, were to take over the ships and we did so, as well as four submarines.

Our crews were trained and were waiting ready to take over the remaining eight.

However, the ideological differences between the two parties had begun, and with Khrushchev, they were bound to have repercussions on such a sensitive spot as the Vlora naval base. He and his men would distort the official agreement for two aims: first, to put pressure on us, to make us submit, and second, if we did not bend the knee, they would try to seize the base themselves, as a powerful starting point from which to occupy the whole of Albania.

Especially after the Bucharest Meeting, the Soviet experts, advisers and other militarymen at the Vlora naval base stepped up the frictions, quarrels and incidents with our sailors. The Soviet side stopped all supplies of the materials they were supposed to provide for the base according to the agreement concluded; all the work commenced was suspended unilaterally and the provocations and blackmail were increased. The staff of the Soviet Embassy in Tirana, as well as the main representative of the General Command of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty, General Andreyev, placed themselvés at the head of this savage anti-Albanian and antisocialist activity. Countless acts of the filthiest vandalism were carried out by the Soviet personnel at the base on orders from above, and despite this, «to be in order», they tried to accuse our people over the acts of hooligans they committed themselves. Their shamelessness and cynicism reached the point that the «chief representative», Andreyev, sent a note to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania in which he claimed that Kunpleasant acts were occurring at the base» from the side of the Albanians. And what were these «acts»? -Such and such an Albanian sailor threw his cigarette butt on the deck of the Soviet ship», «the children of Dukat tell the Soviet children 'Go home'», «the Albanian waiter in a club told our officer, 'I am in charge here and not you'», etc. General Andreyev even complained to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Albanian state that an unknown child had allegedly relieved himself secretly near the building used by the Soviets.

With completely just indignation one of our officers answered Andreyev:

«Comrade General,» he said, «why do you not take up the key problems, but involve yourself with such trifles, which do not come within the authority even of the ships' commanders, but of the boatswains and the volunteers of the Front organization in charge of the residential blocks?!»

Keeping cool, we vigilantly watched the development of the situation and continually instructed our comrades to act cautiously and patiently, but never to submit and never fall for the provocations of Khrushchev's agents.

«In order to avoid disorder and incidents, the Vlora base should be placed completely under the command of the Soviet side!» proposed the Soviets.

We would never, never accept such a solution. It would be signing ourselves into slavery. We firmly opposed them and referred thern to the agreement, under which the base was ours and ours alone.

In order to give their proposal the colour of a joint decision, in March 1961, they exploited a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty, at which Grechko insisted that the Vlora base should be left entirely in Soviet hands, and placed «under the direct command» of the General Commander of the Warsaw Treaty, that is, of Grechko himself.

We firmly and indignantly opposed this proposal and, although the decision was adopted by the others, we declared:

«The only solution is that the Vlora base must remain in the hands of the Albanian Army. We will not permit any other solution.

Then the Khrushchevites decided not to hand over to us the eight submarines and other ships which, according to the agreement, belonged to Albania. We insisted that they were ours and demanded that the Soviet crews should be withdrawn and everything handed over to our sailors, as had been done with the first four submarines. Besides the «chief representative», Andreyev, the Soviet revisionists also sent a certain rear-admiral to Tirana. This whole team was comprised of officers of the Soviet security service, sent to organize disturbances, sabotage and diversion at the Vlora base.

«We shall not give you the ships,» they said, «they are ours.»

We confronted them with the state agreement and they found another pretext.

«Your crews are not ready to take them over, they are not completely trained.»

These were all pretexts. Our sailors had gone through the respective schools, had been training for years and had always proved they were completely capable of taking over the submarines and the other ships. Just a few months before the situation became tense, the Soviets themselves had declared that our crews were ready to take over the vessels that belonged to us.

On this, too, we gave them the answer they deserved. Our officers and sailors at the base carried out all the orders we gave them coolly, with determination and iron discipline. The Soviet provocations at the base were stepped up, especially at the time when we were in Moscow at the Meeting of the 81 parties. The comrades of our Political Bureau kept us informed from Tirana about everything that occurred, and from Moscow we gave them guidance and advice to keep cool, to guard against provocations and to strengthen their vigilance, as well as on the military measures they had to take in Vlora and throughout the whole country to ensure that the army was in full readiness.

The orders to the Soviet officers in Albania on how they should behave came from Moscow, where we were holding fierce debates with Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, etc., during those days.

At the first meeting we had with Mikoyan and his colleagues in Moscow, on November 10, as soon as he started speaking, he tried to frighten us:

«Your officers are behaving badly with ours at the Vlora base. Do you want to leave the Warsaw Treaty?»

We immediately gave Mikoyan the reply he deserved. After years of filling us up to the neck with his Hcriticisms» and «advice», now he was threatening us. We mentioned the unworthy behaviour of Soviet officers at the Vlora base, especially the villainous actions of one of the Soviet «rear-admirals-, who, I told Mikoyan, «might be anything, but certainly not a rear-admiral>*; I mentioned the statements of Grechko and Malinovsky, who had also threatened that they would expel us from the Warsaw Treaty, etc.

My reply made him wriggle and squirm, trying to dodge any responsibility, but two days later Khrushchev made the same threat.

«If you like, we can dismantle the base,» he shouted, while we were talking about the major disagreements created.

«Are you trying to threaten us with this?» I said.

«Comrade Enver, don't raise your voice,» Khrushchev interrupted, Hthe submarines are ours.

«Yours and ours,» I said, we are fighting for socialism. The territory of the base is ours. We have a signed agreement about the submarines, which recognizes the rights of the Albanian people. I defend the interests of my country. Therefore, take good note that the base is ours and will remain ours.

When we returned from Moscow, the provocations at the base were increased and in order to exert pressure on and impress us, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Firyubin, came to Tirana with two other «deputies»: the first deputychief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army and Navy, Antonov, and the deputy chief of the Supreme Staff of the Soviet Navy, Sergeyev.

They came allegedly «to reach agreement», but in fact they brought us an ultimatum:

The Vlora base must be put completely and solely under Soviet command, which was to be subordinate to the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty.

«We are the masters here,» we told them clearly and bluntly. «Vlora has been and is ours.»

HThis is the decision of the Command of the Warsaw Treaty,» threated Firyubin, the former Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, at the time of the Khrushchev-Tito reconciliation.

We gave him the reply he deserved and, after tiying to frighten us by saying, «We shall take the ships and the imperialists will gobble you up,» he left, accompanied by the two other generals.

After them, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Kasatonov, came to Tirana with the mission of seizing not only the eight submarines and the floating dock with Soviet crews, which were also the property of the Albanian state, but even the submarines which we had taken over earlier. We told him bluntly : Either you hand the submarines over to us according to the agreement, or within a short time (we set the date) you must withdraw immediately from the bay, with only those ships on which your crews serve. You are violating the agreement, you are stealing our submarines, and you will pay for this stand.

The admiral wriggled and tried to soften us, but in vain. He did not hand over the submarines, but went to Vlora, boarded the command submarine and lined up the others in fighting formation. We gave orders to close the Sazan Narrows and to train the guns on the Soviet ships. Admiral Kasatonov, who had wanted to frighten us, was frightened himself. He was caught like a rat in a trap and if he attempted to implement his plan he might find himself at the bottom of the sea. In these conditions the admiral was obliged to take only the submarines with Soviet crews, and he sailed out of the bay back home with his tail between his legs. A great evil was removed from our land, once and for all.

In the last year in particular, the Soviets at the Vlora base committed innumerable vile and revolting acts. However, at those delicate moments the group of our officers at the base capably and intelligently defended the Party against the plotters, provocateurs and chauvinists, who corrupted the feelings of the Soviet sailors to the ultimate degree. They holed the reservoirs, smashed the beds and windows in the buildings where they lived and worked, etc. They tried to take away everything, down to the last nut and bolt, but did not succeed in their aims. We took a stern stand, defended our rights properly and replied to the attacks and provocations with cool tempers, while they lost their heads.

The Soviet revisionists were furious. They committed every act of sabotage and broke the agreements. They were compelled to recall ambassador Ivanov arnd sent a certain Shikin in his place. He was to try to prepare the final act of the hostile work of the Soviet revisionists - to split the Party. The Khrushchevites hoped to bring about the split at the 4th Congress which we were preparing. They deceived themseives that what they had failed to achieve in other ways, might occur at our congress. They expected that the congress would denounce the line pursued by the leadership of our Party in Bucharest and Moscow. At that period, the bourgeoisie and reaction, informed and directly and indirectly incited by the Khrushchevites, Titoites and their agents, had launched a campaign of slanders against our country and Party. They hoped that the revisionist cataclysm would occur in Albania, too. «Enver Hoxha chief of the Albanian Communist Party will soon be relieved of his post, as a result of the conference of communist leaders of the world which was held last month in Moscow,. reported a Western news agency, in a commentary stemming from Belgrade, on the eve of the opening of our 4th Congress.

«Observers of Eastern Europe say that Moscow will use its influence to bring about changes in the Communist Party of Albania, which took a hard line at the Moscow Conference,» said the imperialist news agencies during those days, and continued: «Although even communist China accepted the Soviet line, the Albanians have persisted in their stand.»

We read these reports of the sooth-sayers of imperialism with scorn and knew very well who had a hand in compiling them.

At the meeting which was organized on November 25, 1960, between the delegations of the PLA and the CPSU, Mikoyan personally, told Comrades Mehmet and Hysni:

«You will see what difficult situations will come about within your Party and people with this change you are making in your relations with the Soviet Union.»

We heard such threatening statements, sometimes open, sometimes camouflaged, from all directions.

Nevertheless we calmly continued our course: we invited delegations from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and from other communist and workers' parties. From the Soviet Union came Pospyelov and Andropov, from Czechoslovakia a certain Barak, who was minister of the interior and was later jailed as a thief, etc. Let them come and see with their own eyes what the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian people were, let them try to achieve their secret aims. They would catch their own fingers in the trap.

The congress opened in an atmosphere of indescribable enthusiasm and unity of the Party and our people. The opening day was turned into a real people's celebration. The people, singing, dancing and carrying flowers, escorted the delegates to the entrance of the building where the congress was to be held and while the work began within, the celebration continued outside. This was the initial reply which the Khrushchevite, Titoite and other revisionists received right at the start. They would continue to receive other crushing blows inside.

It had never crossed the minds of Pospyelov, Andropov and their lackeys that they would find themselves in the midst of such a fire, which warrned and strengthened our hearts and seared and blinded them. Throughout all the days of the congress, the steel unity of our Party around its Central Committee, the high degree of maturity and keen Marxist-Leninist sense of the delegates, the vigilance, keen-wittedness and readiness of every delegate to give the proper reply to any provocation on the part of revisionist «friends-, were outstanding.

Pospyelov's speech, with which the revisionists hoped to create the split in our congress, was not applauded at all. On the contrary, it was received with silence and contempt by the delegates to the congress. From his box, Andropov openly directed his puppets as to when they should clap, when they should remain seated, or rise to their feet. It was a ludicrous spectacle. They discredited themselves completely, both with the stands they adopted and with the base things they did.

The representative of the Communist Party of China at the congres was Li Xiennien, who sat in stony silence through the sessions when he saw the enthusiasm of the delegates. From the tribune he said some good words addressed to our Party, but «advised» us to be patient and cautious and not break off the talks with Khrushchev. We went about our own business.

When they saw that our ranks were very solid, without any sign of a breach, the Khrushchevites intensified their interference, pressure and blackmail. They provoked us everywhere.

«What is this?!» Andropov angrily asked one of our comrades, a functionary at the apparatus of the Central Committee of our Party who was accompanying him. KWhy do the delegates cheer so much for Enver Hoxha?!»

«Go and ask them!» said our comrade. 4,But tell me,» he continued, Kfor whom should they cheer, apart from Marxism-Leninism, the Party and its leadership?! Or do you intend to propose that we should put someone else at the head of the Party?!»

The blow went home and Andropov pulled in his horns. The Greek delegate and Rudolph Barak of Czechoslovakia were brought into action. Apart from other things, the Greek delegate considered incorrect the reply which we had given to the anti-Albanian talk which Sophocles Venizelos had held with Khrushchev about «Northern Epirus». «Venizelos is not a bad man, he is a progressive bourgeois democrat,» the Greek delegate told our comrade accompanying him. Our comrade replied that the views of the «democrat» Venizelos about «Northern Epirus» were no different from those of the rabid chauvinist and anti-Albanian, Eleutherios Venizelos. Apart from other acts, even the speech which the Greek delegate was to deliver at our congress was in an openly provocative spirit, and Mehmet, becoming angry, gave the Greek the reply he deserved in front of everybody, by describing him with this true name: provocateur.

Khrushchev's other agent, Barak, also exploited the occasion along with others, who, through actions worthy of the dirtiest scoundrels, tried to vent their spleen, but only discredited themselves and those who had sent them even more. They operated from the boxes, or in the intervals between sessions. In the meantime, the Soviet journalists had also gone into «action».

What did they and those who commanded them not do in order «to discover» some shortcoming at which they could grasp to launch their attack! But they achieved nothing. The congress went like clock-work. With a profound sense of responsibility, the Albanian communists drew up the balance of the past and defined the tasks for the future. However, the revisionists could not go away entirely «empty-handed», because they would have to render account to their masters. And they found the «shortcoming»:

«There are many ovations and consequently the sessions go on for more than one hour and a half,w an alleged journalist of TASS, just arrived from Moscow to follow the proceedings of the congress, «protested» angrily.

«What can we do? Should we tell the delegates not to applaud?!- asked our comrade accompanying him, in a sarcastic tone.

ÍThe time-table should be respected, an hour and a half and tochka*,» * (full stop (Russian in the original).) said the «journalist».

«However, it's not the journalists, but the elected presidium that presides over the congress,» replied our comrade. «Nevertheless, if you consider it reasonable, make some protest against ovations...

Before they departed after the congress, Pospyelov and Andropov sought a meeting with us.

«We want to talk about some matters which have to do with our mutual comradely relations,» said Pospyelov, who spoke first. «We want to strengthen the friendship between us, to have a strong friendship.»

«This is what we have always wanted, too,» I said, «but doni think that this close friendship will be strengthened through the 'holy spirit'. This friendship can be achieved by applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism correctly and consistently.»

I went on to list to Pospyelov some of their anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian actions, and I stressed that there could never be friendship on the course which the Soviet leadership was following.

«You are interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet leadership,» he said.

I told Pospyelov: «To say that this or that view or action of this or that leader is not right, is not in any way interference in the internal affairs of a leadership. We have never intended to interfere in your internal affairs. However, you must understand clearly that neither have we permitted, nor are we going to permit the Soviet leadership to interfere in the internal affairs of our Party in any way. Every party is master of its own house.

«It is true,» I continued, «that there are major ideological «differences between our two parties. We told you of our opinions about these things openly and according to all the Leninist norms. You reacted angrily to this, and apart from other things, extended these ideological differences to other fields. Mikoyan wanted to frighten us with 'the difficult situations' which would emerge for us in the Party and this was a threat. You have seen our situation,» I said, «therefore tell Mikoyan what you saw at the 4th çongress of our Party and tell him to what degree our Party is 'split' !»

The aim of these scoundrels was to tell us that, among other things, all the agreements and protocols on credits, which they had accorded us for the five-year plan, would have to be reexamined. To this end they demanded that I should go to Moscow.

We resolutely rejected these hostile demands, which concealed sinister plans.

«The economy is another field to which you have extended the ideological differences which exist between us,» we told Pospyelov and Andropov. «This is not Marxist, nor is it befitting a party and state such as yours.»

«We do not understand you,» interrupted Pospyelov. «In what do you see this?»

«There are scores of facts,» we said. «But let us look at your stand towards our economic delegation, which went to the Soviet Union last November. This delegation was kept hanging around in Moscow for months on end. No one received it, no one listened to it. Apart from other attempts, our economic delegation sent more than 20 letters and telegrams to the respective organs of your side, just during the days of its stay there, but no reply came, nothing was discussed and nothing was signed. Do you think that we doni understand these stands of yours, which have the smell of blackmail?»

«When the Yugoslavs go there you finish the talks with them in 10 days,» said Mehmet.

«The war minister of Indonesia went to Moscow and agreements were signed immediately. You gave him big credits for armaments,» I said, -while you neglected little socialist Albania, with which you have agreements.»

«You must come to Moscow for talks,» they said, repeating Khrushchev's constant demand that I should go there.

«We have replied to you in writing,» I told them. «There is no reason for me and Mehmet to go to Moscow to discuss problems which have been discussed and decided long ago. As you are well aware we have discussed and jointly drafted the agreement on credits for our coming five-year plan, not just in principle, but giving details of all the projects. On the basis of this agreement, Soviet experts came here, drew up the designs, etc. While now you want us to go back there to re-examine the agreements! Why?! We cannot agree to remove one comma from all those very detailed documents, which have been signed at the top level by the two sides,» I replied to the revisionists, and went on:

«There is no reason for me to go to Moscow and I do not want to go. As for the agreements, there are two ways open to you: either you respect them or you violate them. It depends on you which way you choose. If you violate the agreements and continue your hostile anti-Marxist course, the world will judge you and condemn you. We told you openly, like Marxists, everything we had against you. Now you must choose: either the road of Marxist-Leninist friendship or the road of hostility.»

As was natural for them, the Khrushchevites chose the road of hostility to the People's Republic of Albania and the Party of Labour of Albania. They became more furious and more shameless in their actions. As is known, at that period we discovered and smashed the plot of several impérialist and revisionist foreign powers, which, in collaboration with their agents in our ranks, wanted to launch a military aggression against our country and people. At the 4th Congress of th6 Party we announced that the plot had been discovered and that the conspirators, Teme Sejko and others, would render account to the people's court. The conspirators admitted everything with their own mouths.

Precisely at this time, our -friends», members of the Warsaw Treaty, headed by Khrushchev, apart from their threats, declared to us: «A special commission of the Warsaw Treaty should come to Albania to verify how well-founded were the things you said about the plot»! Their perfidy had gone as far as this. They wanted to come to Albania to achieve what the others were unable to achieve. For this, too, we gave them the reply they deserved.

Khrushchev was left without another move. He tried all his manoeuvres, cunning, traps and blackmail on us and none of them yielded results. Then he came out openly against us. At the 22nd Congress of his party, in October 1961, Khrushchev publicly attacked and slandered the Party of Labour of Albania.

We replied at once, openly, to his base antiAlbanian attacks and through the press made known to the Party and the people both Khrushchev's accusations against us and our stand towards those accusations and attacks.

Khrushchev immediately received not only our reply but also that of the whole Albanian people: in thousands of thousands of telegrams and letters which came to our Central Committee from all corners of the country, from the most varied strata of the population, the communists and our people, while expressing their profound and legitimate indignation at the treacherous actions of Khrushchev, supported the line of the Party with all their strength and pledged that they would defend and apply this correct line to the end in the face of any test or sacrifice.

Then Khrushchev undertook his final act against us - the only thing left undone - unilaterally, he broke off diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Albania. This was his final desperate gesture of revenge: «Since they did not want to stay under my wing, let the imperialists gobble them up,» he thought. But he was terribly wrong, just as he had been wrong all his life. We gave a resolute reply to his hostility and that of the Khrushchevite lackeys. Heroically and with Marxist-Leninist maturity, the Party of Labour of Albania resisted the attacks of modern revisionism led by Khrushchev and counter-attacked hard, with exemplary solidarity, with great MarxistLeninist clarity and with indisputable and undeniable arguments and facts.

The revolutionary words and opinions of the Party of Labour of Albania were listened to with respect everywhere in the world. The proletariat saw that this small party was successfully and gloriously defending Marxism-Leninism against the revisionist cliques that were in power. Modern revisionism, headed by Soviet revisionism, was exposed and is still being exposed with revolutionary courage by our Party.

The revisionist Soviet Union has suffered colossal defeats in every field. Its pseudo-Marxist disguise was torn from it and it lost the prestige and authority which had been forged by Lenin, Stalin and the Bolshevik Party which they led. The communists, the revolutionaries and fighters for people's liberation. were not to be deceived by the demagogy of the Khrushchevite revisionists. Our Party has made, is making and always will make its contribution to this revolutionary work.

Thus the relations of socialist Albania with the revisionist Soviet Union came to an end. However, our struggle against the treacherous, fascist, social-imperialist activity of the Khrushchevite and Brezhnev revisionists did not cease and will not cease. We have attacked them and will go on attacking them until they are wiped from the face of the earth, until the joint struggle of the peoples, revolutionaries and Marxist-Leninists all over the world triumphs everywhere, including the Soviet Union.

One day the Soviet people will sternly condemn the Khrushchevites and will honour and love the Albanian people and the Party of Labour of Albania, as they loved us in better times, because our people and Party fought unflinchingly against the Khrushchevites, who are our common enemies.

1976



Part I

Part II